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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the changing positions 
-of the Louisville Courier-Journal concerning American govern-
ment policy and action in Vietnam from 1954 to 1969, and to 
identify the principal factors which underlay changes in . the 
paper's viewpoint. Similarly this paper attempts to show 
the relation b~tween such shifts and changes within the 
Courier-Journal staff and management, variations in the 
government policy, or alterations in the military and 
political situation in Vietnam. Courier-Journal opinion is 
thus correlated with Vietnam-related events and American 
foreign policy. In determining Courier-Journal editorial 
policy both staff-written and syndicated editorials are 
considered. In addition, editorial cartoons are taken into 
account-. 
For ~onvenience, the period under study is divided 
into 'five peri~ds. The first chapter includes 1954 and 1955 
when the Courier-Journal advocated· intervention in Indochina 
and presented syndicated columnists who voiced similar 
sentiments. C_hapter two deals with 1956 to 1960 when few 
edi toriai's commented on Vietnam and the American commitment 
there was indefinite. In the third chapter, an analysis of 
"'· the Kennedy years, the paper begins to shift to a more 
:t- pacifistic attitude and ceases supporting the war. The 
Johnson Administration manifests a new editorial policy 
advocating negotiation and criticism of the war. Chapter 
four studies this shift and Courier-Journal opposition in 
1965 to Johnson's war policy. Chapter five details the 
further development of this policy in the period 1966-1969. 
The final chapter is a summary of the entire period. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to chronicle the 
history of the Vietnam conflict or to consider the reaction 
of the Courier-Journal to its entire course. Rather, this 
paper concerns itself exclusively with the period 1954-1969 
and ends with the termination of the Johnson Administration. 
This paper begins near the end of French Colonial rule 
in Indo-China. This colonial administration which began in 
the 1850's and continued uninterrupted to 1940 became the 
victim of the surge of post World War II nationalism which 
swept non-western countries. Its · chief antagonist was a 
Vietnamese Communist and Nationalist Ho Chi Minh whose 
dedicated mobile forces had been harassing Frerich re-establish-
ment of colonial rule since the Japanese defeat of 1945. 
During World War II Ho had been considered primarily a useful 
nationalist and had received United States aid in his efforts 
against the Japanese. In the postwar years more emphasis 
had been put on his Corrmunist affiliations and American aid 
had gone to his French enemies. After years of constantly 
increasing attritional warfare the French Union Forces in 
1954 were dealt a stunning defeat . by .the Viet-Minh at Dien 
Bien Phu. This defeat coupled with the general disgust of 
the war weary French led them to seek a negotiated settle-
ment. Thus at the beginning of the period covered by t;his 
' 
paper, the French situation in Indo-Chin~ .was desperatJ. 
The Vie·t-Minh held the upper hand and world ~ttention · 1 
focused on the outcome of upcoming peace talks. 
. I 
i 
CHAPTER I i 
' 
A PRO~INVOLVEMENT STANCE, 1954-1955 
1954 h C J 1 f d Am • 11 In t e ourier- ourna avore erican invo ve-
ment in Southeast Asia. During that ?nd the-following year, 
the paper advocated commitment of American funds and supplies 
to Indo-China and supported the use of airstrikes to aid 
the beleaguered French at Dien Bien Phu. 
_. -The paper assumed _this stance largely because the 
attitude. of its editorial staff was clearly internationalist, 
a policy dating back to at least the 1940 1 s·. The Courier-
Journal had supported Franklin D. Roosevelt's international-
ist policies, praised the establishment of the United 
Nations,- and agreed with President Harry Truman's cold.war 
policy of keeping American forces abroad. The publisher of 
the.Courier-Journal at the time was Mark F. Ethridge, a 
. ' 
Nqrth .c_aroliria newspaperman, strongly anti-Communist and 
po.lie i tally_ conservative. The editor was the somewhat :more 
liberal internationalist, Barry Bingham. Among the staff 
writer9 of 1954 and 1955 were editorial-page editor Russel 
B~iney, Adele.Brandeis, Molly Clowes, Tarleton·collier, 
·weldon James, Grover Page and John Ed Pearce. No change 
occurred in the make-lip of. _this staff until the departure 
i 
of Tarleton Collier in 1958. Essentially the staff waS 
1 
conservative and ready to support a major effort to stem 
the tide of Communism in Southeast Asia. Among its members 
English-born Molly Clowes, who joined the paper in 1947, 
would become the most vehement critic of Vietnam policy. 
Veteran editor Russel Briney as well as writers John Ed 
Pearce (in the beginning) and Weldon James were extremely 
pro-war. James, in 1954 recently out of the M~rine Corps 
with a good memory of Korea, fully supported the Vietnam 
conflict and United States intervention, during his tenure 
on the paper. Indeed the paper's changing view of the war 
prompted hi s eventual resignation. With few exceptions the 
paper's editorials were unsigned and products of composite 
views. Thus there existed a problem in determining which 
members of the staff were most influential at any specific 
time. The balance in 1954 and 1955, one may conclude from 
the paper's editorial policy, favored the war supporters, 
the anti-Communist tough liners . 
2 
The Courier-Journal advocated a forceful American anti-
Communist policy in relation -to Indo-China. In line with this 
positi on the paper prai sed a John Foster Dulles speech of 
early April, 1954, which advocated str ong American commit~ 
ments to Indo-China. The paper lauded the Secretary of State 
for squarely facing the facts and giving the Communists no 
hint of weakness. Indeed, the paper felt, "the Dulles 
speech has cut the ground f r om under the growing group of 
appeasers, in Pari s, "1 By this term the paper meant the 
1The Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 6, 1954. 
3 
French government, which it felt was giving in unnecessarily 
to the. Communist demands in its efforts to achieve a peaceful 
solution to the conflict in Inda-China •. The "facts" the 
, I 
paper felt, were that a concession to the Communist in Inda-
l 
China could only lead to further demands elsewhere. As an 
· example, the paper cited the Kunich Conference of 1938. 
Instead the United States and the French should stand fast 
against all Communist demands. The paper was following the 
tide of public opinion.· Neither the Courier-Journal nor 
American public opinion would approve concessions to 
Communism in 1954. 
In 1954 and 1955,. the Courier-Journal advocated American 
involvement in the Inda-China War. Its editorials supported 
the French effort at Dien Bien Phu. Indeed, it condoned 
heavy United States financial aid to the French in their 
effort. When on February 11, 1954, the United States ~ir 
. Force sent two hundre·d technicians to Inda-China as a part 
of the American aid program, the Courier-Journal praised the' 
action. The·paper rationalized it as possibly prevent;ing the 
sending of more troops later, perhaps in a combat cap8;city. 
Although·the paper did not advocate use of American combat 
units, it certainly approved of any effort to provide the 
.French with non-combat technicians in small numbers and 
spare parts, obsolete aircraft as well as maintainence: 
. equipment. Without such American effort, Inda-China m,ight 
fall to the Viet-Minh? thus opening the way to the ultimate 
. f 
fall of all Asia to Communism. This fear of a chain-
4 
reaction fall of many nations to Communism was called ~he 
rtdomino-theoryrt and was prominent in American thinking of the 
early fifties. It not only found popularity among editorial 
writers. of the time but also helped form the 
Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy. 
basis of · f he 
Thus Indo,-
China took on more than its intrinsic importance. It was 
I 
vi.ewed as a vital domino in the chain, one which could fall 
to Communism and start a chain-reaction in Asia or might 
s·tand firm against the tide of "Communist aggression," 
serving as a formidable dike against. the red tide of 
Communism. 
_. . What the Courier-Jou·rnal failed to take into account 
was the role .. of the Vietnamese people in this issue. It 
simply ignored the rising nationalism of the Vietnamese as 
it.ignored the fact that the French role was not primarily 
that of an anti-Communist force, but rather that of a 
' . 
I 
colonial. power. Furthermore ·the paper, in 1954 at least, 
viewed Communism as a monolthic force, controlled and oper-
ated from·Moscow. In doing so, it committed itself to' oppose 
Ho Ch:j. Minh simply because he was a Communist and to ignore 
his rote as le·ader of Vietnamese: nationalists • 
• 
· ·However, soon after this April 6 editorial the paper 
carried the· counter-opinion of .Drew Pearson, the national 
c<;>lumnis.t:, · who saw war in Indo-China as an embarrassin~ 
dilemma, a quagm~re which the United States. should avoid. 2 
2rbid., April 8, 1954. 
While the Courier-Journal strongly advocated American 
involvement in Indo-China, the paper also on rare occasions 
I presented columnists .of differing views. In 1954 Pears
1
on 1 s 
comment of April 8 was the only such editorial presente,d. 
Perhaps the paper was simply attempting to appear 
in presenting both sides of a controversial issue. 
' 
unbiased 
' I 
I Mo:r,e 
likely however, the paper's staff entertained some small 
doubts about the advisibility of full intervention in Indo-
China. While lacking the necessary concensus of opinion to 
compose a staff editorial on the subject, perhaps the · 
paper expressed this doubt-by printing the Pearson comment, 
Obviously by early April the staff position had some-
what solidified. At that time Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 
Chief of Naval Operations, proposed a United States carrier-
based air-strike against the Viet-Minh positions around 
Dien Bien Phu, a strike designed to show United States; 
determination to deter Communist aggression through air 
power, thus avoiding a land war in Asia •. The Couri.er- · 
Journal supported this plan and contended that if inter,. 
vention could be confined to such airstrikes, that· was the 
thing to do. 3.· The paper saw air power ~s· a 11 clean11 way t9 
·deal with the problem.- Through the effective use of its· 
carrier-based air forces, the United States could assist the 
French and yet avoid the intricacies and possible· long· term 
commi.tments of an Asian land war. The paper ·would· co~-
tinuously voice its distaste for .lan9 wars in Asia, J 
3rbid., April 11, 1954. 
5 
By mid-April the tone of Couri er-Journal editorials 
had become more moderate, expressing hope for the upcoming 
Geneva Conference and peace. This conference on the future 
Indo-China included co-chairmen from the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union as well as representatives of Comnunist 
China, France and the states of Indo-China. The United 
States also sent as its representative Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles. The paper felt that the conference 
should be gi ven every pos sible chance of success. It con-
tended "time and the rainy season, for once, justify the 
free world in delaying the issuance of ultimatums almost 
4 
certain to guarantee the f ailure of the conference." The 
appeal was for moderation in hope of a negotiated settlement 
for the time being but there was no call for abandonment of 
the French e f fort in Indo-China. The paper remained 
unconvinced, though hopeful, about the chances for a real 
and lasting negotiated settlement. The staff felt that: 
It is the conviction of all informe d observers 
that a truce in Indochi na would dissolve the country 
into Communi sm in a ma t ter of weeks . I t i s more than 
possible t hat the end r e5ult would be Communism over all the Asian continent. 
6 
At thi s point the staff opinion appeared to falter. It 
equivocated on the point of a negotiated peace. On the one 
hand it supported such a move a s the speediest, leas t costly 
way out of the Indo-Chi na si tuation. On the other hand it 
4rbid., April 15, 1954. 
5rbid., April 18 , 1954. 
7 
feared·the outcome of negot:i,at;i.ons would favor the Communists. 
Obviously, such a result would be unacceptable. Thus the 
paper was left in an ambiguous position; 
Despite this seeming contrad:ict:ion the 
clung to the view that Communist domination 
Courier-Journal. 
of al! Asila would 
result from a French defeat in Indo-China and that a 
negotiated s·ettlement would be better than a French defeat or 
withdrawal. As earlier in 1954, this.attitude probably 
reflected the general tone of public sentiment toward 
Com.rnunism. These were the days of Senator Joseph McCarthy 
and the second 11Red Scare." The fall of China to Communism, 
the demise of a free Eastern Europe and -the Korean War con-
tributed to anti-Communist fears. Therefore, the paper'hoped 
for more than a mere truce at Geneva. Rather it demanded 
finnness in negotiations in hopes of a pro-Western settlement. 
In line with its policy of supporting American aid to 
I 
the Fren'ch in Indo-China, the paper ~commended an Ameri~an 
airlift of French troops to Indo-China. Indeed, an editorial 
maintained: 
·• .. ,· • on the balance it seems clear that Dulles's 
· bold decision--to let Peking and Moscow know that 
th{s country· will fight rather than let Indochina 
go down the drain--has a6ready greatly strengthened the posture of the West. ._ -
Such a·strong stand, the- paper held, raised t~e hope that the 
Geneva _Conference.might be more than -a mere sellout, 
6rbid,, April 22, 19'.54. 
1954 (p-:-I"""this paper). 
cf. Ibid., February 11, J 
' 
8 
The syndicated columnists in the Courier-Journal 
displayed.nearly identical opinions about the conference at 
Geneva and voiced fear of a settlement favorable to th~ 
' Communists. David Lawrence praised early American action at 
I 
Geneva as, "skillful, resolute, tactful, firm.n 7 He 
1 
seemingly believed that any settlement which was in thJ 
-
smallest degree favorable to-the Communists constituted a 
sellout. But the anti-Communists viewpoint was not as 
universal as the paper's editorials indicated. Both the 
British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden and former Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill-, argued against a strict hard-
tine course maintaining ·that Geneva offered, "hope of a 
genuine effort at an. international detente."8 Dulles would 
have none of it and the paper supported his position. 
The editorial of May 1, 1"954.left no doubts.that the 
. ' 
Courier-Journal advocated a strong anti-Communist position. 
' . 
•·: 
On that day, an editorial and cartoon prai_i;;ed Dulles 1 ~pening-
speech at Geneva in which he pressed fo"r _decisive anti_; 
Communist action. Dulles sought united a~tion with FrJnce, 
• • • • + 
the United Kingdom and the United States cooperating in-
tl).e defense of. Southeast Asia against Co"llllllUnist aggre~sio·n 
implying the possible use of American ground troops in such 
"united action." The paper concluded that: 
7 b. 
~., April 30, 1954. 
8David Horo.witz, The Free Wo.rld Colossus (New YoJk: 
Hill and Wang, 1965), p. 150. 
Sooner or later the free governments must assert 
. their readiness to make sacrifices for collective action 
in Southeast Asia, or else see that area conquered by 
the Communists. A strong American stand at Geneva, 
he (Dulles) said, was the only hoije f.or the salvation · 
of Southeast Asia from Communism. · : . 
. ' 
9 
This stand would include the threat of united milita-rv!action 
. . - J I 
against the Communists. On the opinion page, David Lawrence 
, I 
also praised Dulles claiming, "Dulles presented the facts of 
international life to the assembled delegates in a speech 
that will live long in the history of free men.n10 Lawrence 
further praised Dulles for branding North Korea and Communist 
I 
China aggressors and urging un:Lted action against them by the 
free world. 
May 8 ·the Courier-Journal staff saw a more pressing 
reason for American involvement, or at least continued 
support of the 'French: 
If the French pulled out now and left a power 
vacuum, however, there could be but one result: 
the Communists would take over the country and 
give it to China.11 · 
Syndicated columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop agreed 
with this judgment. Both the Courier..:Journal and .its : 
syndicated writers, the Alsops and Lawrence, expressed 
doubt as·to the effectiveness of any negotiated settlement 
and came to liken the agreement which finally evolved from· 
· Geneva to an 11Asian Munich. 1112 
9The Courier-Journal (Louisville), May 1, 1954. 
lOrbid. 
. I 
11rbid., May 8, 1954. I ' 
12
rb·d 
·__!_·' May 17, 1954. 
This agreement prov:i.ded for division of Indo-China 
into four parts: Communist North Vietnam, pro-western 
South Vietnam and the two neutral states.of Cambodia and 
were to 
10 
Laos. Reunification elections for the two Vietnams 
be held in 1956. The French presence in Indo-China I would be 
I 
. quickly ended. At this time those Vietnamese who 
to· leave the·Communist controlled region would be 
desired-
' I
allowed 
to move to the ·south. Though its rep!esentative, Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles attended the conf.erence, the 
United States did not sign the final document. 
A lack of faith in the results at Geneva led the 
Courier-Journal to ask whether American intervention would 
have been better and to answer in the affirmative. In 
advocating intervention, however, the Couri'er-Journal was 
ready to draw the line at the use of atomic weapons, a 
poli_cy held during the entire course of the Southeast tsian 
conflict. The -paper _might approve Admiral Radford I s proposal 
for a massive conventional airstrike, but it could never 
condone the use of atomic weapons in'Indo-China. The paper's 
reply·to Senator Styles Bridges' proposal of such actibn was 
u~equ\voc~l-. - "We must not use such weapons willy-nilly in 
hqpe of ~n ._'easy'. solution for_ a problem that is embarrassing 
tc;> American politicians _in an election year. 1113 The Courier-
Journal was not alone in holding this view. Extensive 
opp.osi tion in the Eisenhower Administration, the Joint1 Chiefs 
... 
13rbid., June 8, 1954. 
11 . 
. ' 
of Staff and Congress made such use only a remote possi-
·bility. 
The Courier-Journal was not encouraged by the reshlts ; 
of the Geneva Conference. It felt the conference was merely 
a capitulation to Communist designs in Southeast Asia. I As 
a ·result of Geneva it maintained: 
••• we find our side sadly on the defensive. Wh'ile 
the Communists hawk circles ominously in the sky oyer 
Indochina, the Western nations run around like chickens 
clucking and pecking at each other.. • • • The hard lesson 
of Geneva is not despair, but the desperate need for 
united action which will involve the Asian nations.14 
This call for intervention was rationalized by'citing the 
grave danger of vacillation on the part of the United States. 
nif the President and Kr. Dulles are correct as to the 
result of ·a Communis·t victory in Indo-China, then we are on_ly 
guaranteeing that we shall have a tremendous war (by waiting).n15 
The Courier-Journal fully agreed with this Eisenhower-Dulles 
evaluation of the Indo-China situation and in.its edit6rial 
policy supporte~ their views. Both the p~per and the 
Eisenhower Administration believed that re'.sistance- in Indo-
.. 
China was essential in the containment of C?mmuni·sm,. They 
both viewed. Inda-China as the· first in a chain of i!dominoes;tt 
W~en the Geneva pact was signed, the Courier.:.Jouril~l 
·and its syndicated writers denounced the agreement. The 
paper viewed the.division of the territory aii unfair •. It 
held that provisions for enforcement of the treaty were 
14rbid., June 10, 1954. 
15rbid., June 13, 1954. 
12 
unrealistic and for the reunification of Vietnam inoperable. 
As such, the treaty was little more than a legal sellout. 
In addition to comments by the Courier-Journal staff, ~oseph 
and Stewart Alsop claimed that the Geneva pac.t was "a dis-
I 
aster from which the American government cannot possibly 
' 
disassociate itself."16 The Courier-Journal staff exp1;essed 
nruch the same sentiments, holding the treaty in as nruch 
contempt as the Munich accords of 1938. 
In November and December of 1954, United States 4rmy 
General J. Lawton Collins conducted a military advisory and 
evaluation mission to Vietnam and concluded that South; 
Vietnam was far too unstable to survive unaided. He felt 
.that the nation's new Premier Ngo Dinll Diem was unequal to 
the task of solidifying South Vietnam and should be removed. 
Subsequently, the Courier-Journal in an evaluation of this 
mission agreed that the situation was critical and helq that 
I 
.the odds were ten-to-one in Indo-China against the survival 
.o~ a pro-Western state. Such odds existed, the paper con-
cluded, largely because of the terms of. the Geneva·pac~. 
Thi.s pact gave to the Comnrunists North Vietnam, left the door 
open to subversion by the neutralization of Cambodia and Laos 
and outflanked South Vietnam. Furthermore, the paper argued, 
the. treaty provided for the reunification of Vietnam by 
elections which, if carried out, would allow the Communist 
North to swallow the free South. The Courier-Journal Jas 
-, 
16rbid., July 24, 1954. 
not alone in thinking thai a national election would eiimi-
nate.a free South Vietnam. Senator JohnF. Kennedy argued 
that: 
' I 
••• ·despite any wishful thinking to the contrary; 
. · • it should be apparent that the popularity and pre- I 
valence of Ho Chi Minh and his following throughout 
Indochina would cause either partition or a coalition 
government to result in eventual domination by the; 
Communist, 17 ! 
· In evaluating the situation as reported by Gener~l 
Collins, Courier-Journal syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop 
saw little reason for hope. He contended that the United 
' 
' States should,. 11prepare (for) an even larger disaster in 
13 
Asia, 11 because even South Vietnam was rife with CommuJsm. 18 
He ·further argued that in the South the real power lay with 
the Communist controlled Viet-Minh and since the reunification 
elections were so near, there would be no opportunity to 
replace the southern leadership with a democratic governm~nt 
capable of surviving the elections. Thus there remained 
little hope for the continued existence of a non-Communist 
South Vietnam •. At the close of 1954, nothing published on 
the Courier-Journal editorial page offered much hope for the 
s~rvival of a·non-Communist Indo-China, Clearly the paper 
. . 
• 
on.September 10 and especially after Nove~ber 14, 1954'felt 
that withbut a strong leader capable of uniting the South, 
all Vietnam would soon fall to the Communists. 
17Jt>hn F •. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (London: 
Hamil ton, 1960), p. 88. '-· : 
I 
18The Courier-Journal (Louisville), December 19, :1954. 
In 1955, the Courier-Journal's hope for the existence 
of a non-Communist portion of Indo-China grew even dimmer. 
The Saigon government, already unpopular with the paper 
because of its weakness and corruption, became, in its· 
I 
eyes, even more discredited. The paper saw in the Diem 
I 
regime excesses in the exercise of police power, failure to 
. I 
, I 
properly employ armed forces and favoritism toward th~ 1land-. 
holding few of the Catholic ruling class. Botn the Courier-
Journal staff and Joseph Alsop saw the .weakness of the' 
government in South Vietnam as the· beginning of a chain-
reaction loss of Asia. Alsop called this Saigon government, 
"nothing as yet but an obscene basket of eels. n To him it 
seemed weak and ineffective. Still, he felt, there 
because, "Ngo Dinh Diem (is] honest and virtuous •• 
was hope. 
nl9 
• • 
Such a weakness of government could lead, however, to the 
fall of Vietnam, Alsop contended. In his eyes, such a 
disaster as the fall of Southeast Asia to the Communists 
could, "determine·the future ••• of the.whole trend of· 
hist~ry in our times.n20 
The Courier-Journal agreed.· Like ~lsop, th¢ staff saw· 
the demise of South Vietnam as an imminent possibility and 
with similar c·onsequences. nrf the Communists could gain• 
mastery over this mass of humanity, the day of Western 
freedom would come to a blood-red suriset.n 21 
.
19
rbid., January 1, 1955. Diem was the· Presi·dent of 
the Republic of South Vietnam, 1955-63; Premier 1954~55. 
! . 
20rbid., January 13, 1955. 
2lrbid., January 1, 1955. 
Few sourc.es exhibited much £ai th in Diem or his· 
methods for re-uniting Vietnam. In a 1955 report Senator 
Mike Mansfield saw the instability of South Vietnam as 
"unbelievably grave" and maintained, "almost the only _thread 
that linked the multiplicity of £orces in Vietnam is their 
general agreement that Ngo Dinh Diem must go.~22 The\ 
i 
formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (~EATO 
begun September 8, 1954 but not in operation until 1955) 
. ' 
did little to east the fears of the Courier-Journal that 
South Vietnam would soon· fall to the Communists. This 
defense pact designed to be an Asian NATO, the staff 
. . 
believed, fell quite shor~ of that mark. A sta£f-wri t!,ten 
editorial stated that, "at this point we wouldn 1 t give a 
Confederate dollar for the success of that great S. E. A. 
T. O.tt23 
By April, Alsop was ready to write off Diem and 
Vietnam with one stroke of the pen, claiming rtthe Diemi 
-experiment·[i.e. the attempt to establish Diem as the 
· effective leader of.South Vietnam and·to make him capable 
of a strong showing in the reunification electionsj has 
failed. 1124 So_mehow Diem had fallen short of gaining 
popularity and real support in South Vietnam. What he 
needed to do, the paper contended, was to institute real 
22Horowitz·, Ql2.• £it., p. 152. 
23The Courier-Journal (Louisville), February 23, il955. 
24rbid., April 5, 1955. 
·, .... 
16 
land refonn and enforce social legislation aimed at raising 
the literacy and sanitation of the people, and especially 
their standard of living. This unfortunately was exactly 
. I 
what Diem refused to do. His refusal particularly tol carry 
out necessary land refonns cost him the support of hi~ 
. ' 
people and of certain elements of American public opinion, 
I 
The Courier-Journal along with other ·papers became dis-
enchanted with Diem's lack of progress. 25 At the same time 
the Courier-Journal staff felt, "it is obvious that we and 
the French need a fresh start in Vietnam as soon as possi-
.ble. tt 26 Thus· the Courier-Journal, its syndicated columnists, 
and-other press opinion seemed to agree that the United States 
_should disengage itself from support of Diem but not from 
support of an anti-Communist South Vietnam.· None of these 
sources, however, indicated who should replace Diem. 
Diem may well have failed to gain the necessary 
. I 
popularity and_ support needed to build a strong democratic 
Vietnam, but there was no reason to believe that other 
25David Hotham quoted in Vietnam The First Five 
Years~·Lindholm ed., Praeger: New York, 1959, p. 346. The 
Londori_Times held that instead of, uniting it, Diem has· 
divid~d the South. Instead of merely crushing_his legiti-
mate enemies, the Communists, he has crushed all opposition 
of every.kind, however anti-Communist. it might be. In 
doing so he has destroyed the very basis on whichhi.s regime 
should be founded. He has been able to do this, simply and 
solely be.cause of the massive dollar aid he ha"s had from 
acro_ss. the Pacific, which kept in power a man who, by !111 
laws of human an9 political affairs, would long ago have 
fallen. ·niem' s main supporters are to be found in NorJ;h 
America; not in Free Viet,!)am. i 
26The Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 16, 1915. 
I 
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stronger leaders might not succeed. The Courier-Journal 
agreed with the idea espoused by Joseph Alsop. "Unless the 
Communist advance in Southeast Asia can somehow be halted, we 
are probably due to wake up one day to the unpleasant ~is-
covery that Tokyo depends on Saigon. 1127 Once. more the J 
. ' 
' domino theory came into play. If Indo-China fell to the 
I 
Red forces, he believe~ that Japan would be th~eatened:with 
I 
Communist aggression and possibly all-Asia would be _lo~t to 
the free world. The Courier-Journal agreed. Both .the paper 
and its syndicated writers in 1955 ·saw Vietnam_as a danger 
spot in the containment of Communism, arguing that it was 
.imperative that the danger of a Communist take over be met, 
Having·established the fact that the Communist challenge in 
Indo-China had to be met, the paper debated the probable 
methods of meeting it. Effect:i,. ve ac.tion py the local . 
government was the most desirable alternative, but the Diem 
i 
government appeared -incapable of accomplsihing the task. 
Economic aid and technical military assistance seemed to 
offer the most practical solution. As• it had in Europe, 
through the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine, the United_ 
. . 
States could supply the hardware, techrii_cal know-how and. 
funds. ·The Diem government could·. provide the necessary man-
power and the task could be accomplish_ed without involving 
the United States in an Asian land· war. Since this approach 
I 
had worked in Europe, applying it to· Southeast Asia seemed 
27rbid., May 5, 1955, 
togical. The Courier-Journal therefore advocated a stp,ng 
' 
American commitment to the area, in economic aid but nbt 
military assistance involving "in country" operations.· 
• • • I 
As ear~y as October 1954 the United.States began1· 
providing direct assistance to Diem and ceased operati~g its 
aid program through the French. By July, 1955 the French 
• I 
had entirely evacuated Indo-China as required by the Geneva 
' I 
Accords and American aid had partially filled the resulting 
economic vacuum. 
In 1954 and 1955, the Courier-Journal agreed witn 
majority public ·opinion on Indo~China. Containment of 
Communism remained in vogue. The Truman Doctrine remained 
an integral part of American foreign policy and was applied 
by the United States to anti-Communism in Southeast Asia. 
The fall of China to the Communists in 1949 served as a 
reminder to the public, and the Courier-Journal editorial 
staff, of the Communist menace in Asia. Also, the exp¢rience 
of the Korean conflict brought haunting memories of the 
horrors of a land war in Asia. These memories served to 
limit recommendations for Vietnam to economic aid. The · 
Eisenhower.Administration refused ·to commit American ground 
forces in Southeast Asia. The Courier-Journal supported· 
this policy. Despite its occasional reference to military 
intervention durtng the course of the year, by the end of 
1955 the editorial staff had concluded that economic but 
not•direct military assistance offered the best solutiop to 
this "problem" in Asia; .. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DECUNE OF INTEREST AND ACTIVITY, 1956-1960 
In 1956 no Vietnam-related editorials either staff-
written or syndicated were carried by the Courier-Journal. 
There were several obvious reasons fo~ this paucity of ,com-
ment. First and foremost was th~ simple lack;of important 
e·vents in Vietnam. By 1956, Diem was clearly in power in 
South Vietnam; just as Ho Chi Minh was firmly established 
in the North. Both were engaged in the 9o~solidation of 
power. The Communists seemed willing to await scheduled 
.. 
elections which they felt would mean a victory, sans fight-
ing· for them in South Vietnam. They therefore conducted no 
i 
orgl!?ized guerilla operations which might alienate the -
population. This conclusion is borne out by Barry Bingham, 
Sr., p~esident of the Courier-Journal: 
The "li:>w level of comment" on Vietnam from 1955 
to 1958 indicated no preconceived editorial policy 
ort our part, but was a reflection of general lack of 
s4arp concern for affairs in that part of the world. 
I bel~eve you would find thac·news columns at least 
equally reflected this relative absence of interest. 
We know now tqat conditions were developing during 
those years which are still causing us grief and con-
cern. At the time, affairs in Europe seemed of more 
intens_e interest, involving more directly the Cold War 
frictions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.l 
1Personal letter to the author, August 10, 1970. 
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to 
President Kennedy, and author of A Thousand Days, has con-
tended that "the civil war had.begun the year after the 
cancellation of the elections.n2 
initiation of guerilla activities 
This would have put the 
. I 
somewhere in 1957 ati the 
. I 
earliest. Nevertheless Viet Cong supplies from the Nc;>r.th 
could not have been plentiful until 1960. Furthermore, not 
until 1959 were elements of the Viet-Minh reactivated to 
resume the rebellion and not until 1960 was the National 
Liberation Front formed to carry out this task·. 3 
20 
The diversion of the editorial.attention of the paper 
to more sensational and pressing matters was a secondary 
reason for the silence of 1956. Among these were: a Presi-
dential election, the Communist shelling of the off shore 
. . 
islands of Nationalist China, and the Hungarian revolt. 
Consequently, little editorial page space remained for' 
Vietnam comment and even less material· to .. fill it. That .the 
' 
Courier-Journal was not alone on its scarcity of Vietnam-
related comment was clearly shown by the. fact that in ~he 
same year, .the New York Times published only five such• 
editorials. 
During 1957, the total lack of Vietnam comment con-. 
tinued in the Courier-Journal, resulting from the. Eisenhower 
. 
2Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 538. 
. ' . 
' Days .(Boston:.· 
' I . 
' 3walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and·the Cold War, 
1945-1965 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 15$. 
! 
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1ow-key policy on Vietnam and the lack of significant events 
in that country. Eisenhower deeply feared involving the 
United States in another Korea. He, of course, supported 
the idea of containing Communism within its 1947 limit~ (as 
did his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles) but he 
opposed using American forces to accomplish that end •. 
I 
Rather he favored supplying the means and training for the 
South Vietnamese to handle their own troubles; Furthermore, 
no important change in administration policy toward Vietnam 
occurred upon which the paper could comment. The South 
I 
Vietnamese Army continued to be trained in Korea type warfare 
I 
and United States military advisors continued to be present, 
.but this was quite common in many countries. At the time 
the United States was involved in training military personnel 
from such varied c·ountries as West Germany, Korea, and Peru 
either in their own locale or at various bases throughout 
' I 
-the United States. Furthermore, the United States Army 
·maintained at least ·one combat division in West Germany, 
South Korea, France and japan. Its Fleet Marine Force and 
Seventh Fleet supported Nationalist China and its Ranger 
School at·Fort·Benning, Georgia, provided training for Latin 
American·and European as well as Asian army officers. 
Viet Cong terrorism, it is true, had begun by the late 
fifties but had not reached sufficient proportions as tb 
' ; 
alarm the American press, Indeed, the New York Times carried 
only three Vietnam related editorials in 1957, none 
with Viet Cong terrorism.· Thus even this Viet Cong 
dealing 
I 
I 
activity 
did not ·stimulate the Courier-Journal's interest in Vietnam. 
' 
· 22 
' As late as 1958, in readi-ng the Courier-Journal one 
again encounters no Vietnam-related editorials; probab+y for 
the reasons already cited. New 
including the Lebanon crisis, a 
factors emerged that yJar, 
domestic recession andlmid-
! 
term congressional elections which served to divert editorial 
I 
· attention from Vietnam. Like the Courier-Journal the New 
York Times also failed to publish any Vietnam-oriented 
comment in 1958, probably for the same reasons. 
_The following year, the Communist Pathet Lao made an 
attempt to take control in neutral Laos, clearly a violation 
i 
of the 1954 Geneva Accord •. The signatores could do little 
to prevent this movement~ Their offer of ~conomic aid to 
the neutralist regime was but a feeble effort. Because of 
this, _on two occasions, 4 the Couri·er-Journal expressed 
concern for the safety of Vietnam. The paper feared the 
spread of.Communist aggression across the lorig border I · 
. ' 
between Laos and South Vietnam. On both occasions, the 
paper eXJ)ressed the idea that Laos might be the first of a 
chain of countries to fall in domino fashion to Communism. 
If. Laos·were tq be the first, it held, certainly by virtue 
. . ' 
of· geography, if nothing else, South Vietriam would be the 
second. ·nespite the fear for its continued existence, ·the 
. . 
paper praised_the Diem Regime and the apparent.success of 
its land reform program. 5 Other writers doubted that Diem 
. . 
4The Courier-Journai'"· (Louisville), August 14 and J 
September 15, 1959. ·. 
5rbid., October 31, 1959. 
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• 6 
had any real intention of true· land reform. Even the: 
I 
Pentagon Papers that were to gain so nruch notoriety in.later 
I 
investigations cast a shadow of doubt across the reform 
' 
program by concluding: "The Diem land reform prog:ram \ 
instead of redistributing land to the poor, ended up taking 
' I 
back what the peasants had been given by the Vietminh and 
returning it to the landlords :•7 Only forced relocation of 
villagers was carried out and. it served more to alienate- the 
rural.population than to promote'the defensible concentrations 
it was designed to establish • 
. Even though it was optimistic about Diem, the Courier-
Journal was beginning to doubt the effectiveness of the 
American aid program. In January 1955, the United States 
had begun to give aid directly to South Vietnam, From 1955 
to. 1957 this aid was largely confined to support of the 
South Vietnamese Army and the land reform program. It :was 
administered through a complex "counterpart fund 11 which 
allowed many.openings for possible gr~ft, mismanagement or 
corruption. According to Chester L. Cooper, who was involved 
. in·. the -administration of this aid, the fund was: 
. . 
• -~· ·. ii device whereby Vietnamese importers purchas~d 
certain essential goods ••• under a commercial import 
program.· The American Government paid the seller of 
these goods by depositing piasters into a special 
counterpart fund. These funds were then made avail-
able .. to the South Vietnamese Government ••• 80 
6Horowi tz, £P.. cit. ,"·pp. 154-155. 
7sheehan,· et al, The Pentagon.Papers (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1971)-,-p. 71. 
I 
percent of counterpart funds were used by the Ggvern-
ment of South Vietnam for defense expenditures. ., . 
The ·paper was beginning to discover corruption in this i 
program and to sense an attempt to hide it on the partlof I 
the Eisenhower Administration. This apparent concern over 
24 
the alleged corruption can probably be· attributed to 
I 
sudden 
I 
I 
increases in the size ~f the program. 
Sources do not agree as to the precise amount of,aid. 
LaFeber claims that in 1957 aid to South Vietnam amounted to 
$50 million and in 1959 had grown to $207 million, while 
Cooper thinks aid amounted to $1.2 billion between 195~ and 
• I 
·1959 ior an average of $200 million~ year), and Schle~inger 
contends aid at the end of the fifties averaged $300 million· 
a year. This range of figures probably resulted from the 
inclusion of certain indirect commercial aid programs by· 
. . 9 
some sources and dependence on direct aid alone by oth~rs. 
While the paper could overlook graft in a $50 million program, 
graft in a program over four times its.size generated cqn-
. - .---...__. 
siderable interest. 
At the same time that the paper wa·s beginning to have 
doubts concerning the American aid program in Vietnam,, i ~ 
_acquired, in January, 1959, a staff member who would bring 
these and many other alleged seamy aspects. of -this vexation 
to the attention.of the staff and ·public. This· perso~ was 
· Scooper, The Lost Crusade (New York: Dodd Mead, 
p. 165. 
9LaFeber, QE.• cit., p. 204. 
' . . 
11970), 
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editorial cartonist Hugh Haynie. He was to develop into the 
paper's most severe war critic. It would'be difficult to 
exaggerate the effect of Haynie on the paper's Vietnam 
policy. His anti-war efforts were more visible and as, 
widely used, as editorials and undoubtedly reached more i 
people with their message. Though not clear at the time, 
this 1959 staff change laid the ground work for future 
important policy changes. 
During 1960, the Courier-.Journal was silent on Vietnam 
except for one syndicated .editorial, ,in which Joseph Alsop 
warned of future trouble for the United States in Asia. 
Alsop believed Diem was too much influenced by his relatives, 
and his nepotism tended to destroy the few remaining 
democratic tenets of the nation. The silence of the Courier-
Journal staff is in part understandable in view of the fact 
that 1960 was the year of a hotly-contested Presidential 
election in which Vietnam was not an issue. Secondly, no 
·event occurred in Vietnam during 1960 sufficiently effective 
to arouse editorial interest. Even the United States Senate 
in that year considered ending the Military Assist.ance and 
Advisory G10up-Vietnam (MAAG-V) which consisted• of° only a 
few men. 1° Furthermore no significant change in the low-
key Eisenhower policy toward Vietnam took place. 
I , 
Despite 
these factors, Joseph Alsop continued 
situation in Southeast Asia. 11 
to warn of a worsening 
lOschlesinger, 2£• £iE_., p. 539. cf. Horowitz,j op. 
cit., p. 154. 
llThe Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 29, 1960. 
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• Consequently the period 1956-1960.ended without a 
major United States commitment to Vietnam, even in an eco-
nomic sense since aid to Diem at the close of 
"averaged about $300 million a year."12 Also 
cut Courier-Journal reaction to United States 
Vietnam emerged. Relative silence prevailed. 
the fifties 
no clear~ 
I 
poli 0cy on 
I 
This reklected 
i 
the unnoticed and limited nature of the American commLtment, 
and in larger part, mirrored.the discraction of editorial 
I 
' 
attention to seemingly more pres'sing matters closer to home. 
' 
' ,._ I 
' . 
. . 
12schlesin~er, .QB.• cit,, p, · 539. For contrastihg 
-figures cf. LaFeber .QB.• cit., p, 204 and Horowitz, .1m:. ill•, 
p. 154, . 
CHAPTER III 
THE KENNEDY YEARS, 1961-1963 
The years 1961-1963, the Presidency of John F. 
I 
I 
I 
• I 
I 
Kenne.dy, included not only an increasi_ng United States 
commitment to Vietnam but also a growing American fear for 
the future of Southeast Asia. Courier-Journal comment'for 
the period reflected both of these developments. The ; 
depth and intensity of this fear by the Courier-Journal 
staff seemed to grow in nearly direct proportion to the 
American commitment. 
During 1961, Joseph Alsop conti·.nued his pro-inter-
his syndicated series carried by the. 
• I 
, I 
vention policy in 
paper, expressing a fear of the possible domino-like fall of 
.. : 
Southeast Asia, _and advocating decisive action ip.cluding 
the use of American troops to-deter any Communist aggression 
which might trigger such a chain r~action. 1 . He fostered 
the belief that the United States would take only hal~-, 
measures. which· would not be sufficient_to salvag~- the 
. . 
deteriorating situation in Vietnam. In his view only strong 
immediate decisive action could be-successful. 
The Courier-Journal staff took a similar position on 
' 
1The Courier-Journal (Louisville), March 30, April. 16, 
18,. 20, October 7, 12, 24, 26, 27, 31, and-_November 3, 1961. 
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the situation in Vietnam. Assuming a more cautiously 
pessimistic tone than that previously voiced, the staff 
expressed a fear that United States aid to South VietniIDI had 
' 
been of the wrong type. Such aid had equipped a conve~tional 
. I 
army of 150,000 which was far out-classed by the mobile 
forces of the Viet Cong, and had done little 
' 
who, as a result, were slowly drifting toward 
for the people 
I 
• . I • 
Communisih. 2 
Other sources were in agreement. Walter LaFeber concluded 
that ttthe American trained South Vietnamese Army could not 
handle the guerrillas.tt3 Thus the paper was far from alone 
in its feelings; 
Now disillusioned with Ngo Dinh Diem's failure to 
apply western democracy to South Vietnam, to institute 
governmental reforms and to win popular support at home, 
the paper began to express deep concern about his ability to 
effectively lead South Vietnam. The paper's editorial staff 
' 
once more criticized Diem and concluded that continued, 
support of him was in error. Diem could not, it believed, 
properly gove.rn South Vi~ tnam. He did· not have the people I s 
interest at heart. Furthermore, it stated, the United States 
should have learned one ·important lesson from Laos where it 
had mistakenly backed a dictator solely because he ~as ·pro-
western. Backing such men .as Diem in South Vietnam was as 
likely to alienate the people as backing Boun Oum, the 
2rbid., April 19, 1961. 
3LaFeber, .Q.I?.• .£!:!., p. 226. 
p. 156. 
cf. Horowitz, .Q.I?_. 
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fonner dictator of Laos who received extensive United States 
I 
.. 4 
support yet was ousted by his own people. Retaining the 
support of the people, the paper concluded, was more important 
than an extremely pro-western government. Diem needed to 
broaden the base of his government, allow·more popular, 
I 
participation and end harsh restrictions on civil libe~ties. 
I 
His anny needed training in counter-insurgency warfare and 
could gain little from the large unit _tactics taught by 
th_e western powers. What the pa~er ignored irt this evalu-
ation was that South Vietnam lacked a tradition of western 
democracy, of any kind of democracy. The paper implied
1 
that United States type government could _b~ transplanted 
intact to .Vietnam and should be so applied by Diem. Such 
was not the case, and it was poor judgment on the paper's 
part to believe it could or should be done. 
_May of 1961 saw Vice President Lyndon B .• _Johnson on a 
fact~finding mission to South Vietnam. Johnson was impressed 
with the Diem regime, indeed enough so to call Diem the 
"Winston ·churchill of Asia, tr5 and to· advise President 
'Ke~n~dy_to meet the Communist challenge in Vietnam. 6 Also 
in 1961,. at .the conclusion of thE!ir fact-finding mission to 
Vietnam, presidential aide Walter Rostow and Anny General 
Ma:i:cwell D. Taylor issued_a report on the conduct of the war. 
According .. to A'rthtir M". Schlesinger, J,;.·, this report served to: 
I 
4The Courier-Journal'-{Louisville), May 9, 1961. 
5 . 
LaFeber, ££· cit., p. 228. 
6 . 
Ibid., p. 222. 
--
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, , • color future thinking about Vietnam in both 
Saigon and Washington (to assume) ••• that 1 
Vietnam was primarily a military rather than a 
political problem,? 
' 
. According to L.aFeber the report advised "increaJing the 
number of American military advisors and pledging comJlete 
j 
support to Diem. rt8 Since it recommended a military commit-
ment the report may well have reinforced Joseph Alsop·_,[s_ 
conviction that Vietnam was a military problem"and an urgent 
one at that. Its recommendations for military involvement, 
however, did not satisfy Alsop. 9 Perhaps the report did not 
advocate sufficient massive involvement, The Courier-Journal 
had no staff-written editorial reaction to this report', and 
thus either considered it of little significance or had no 
opinion (or insufficient unity of opinion to compose a staff 
editorial). Obviously the lack of comment supports the 
contention that the paper had iittl~ objection to Kennedy 1 s 
policy of using American military personnel in the training 
and logistic support of the South Vietnamese. Neither.did it 
object to the creation of MAA?-V (Military Assistance and 
Advisory Group-Vietnam). 
In 1962, the Courier-Journal staf_f also took·.a some·-
w~at cautious.·stand, while approving of ·Kennedy 1s increa~ed 
economic aid to South Vietnam, as well as increases. in the 
7schlesinger, 
8LaFeber, £2• 
p, 156. 
£2• .£!.!,, p. 545. 
.£!,!,, p. 228. cf. Horowitz, £2·, . cit., 
I . 
9The Courier Journal (Louisville), October 30, 1961. 
number of MAAG-V advisors. Despite its seeming cautious-
ness, the· Courier-Journal was adamant on one point--if :.a 
stand against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia were to 
be made, Vietnam was the place to draw the line. 10 Asloft-
1 
I 
times before, however, the paper contended it.was a st~nd 
only to be taken by Vietnamese troops, I Certainly these 
I 
forces might be American-supplied and American:-trained,· 
but no United States combat forces should be used. The 
paper saw something ominous about the arrival of four , 
hundred Marines and sixteen helicopters in April. This 
seemed to indicate forthcoming massive combat troop in~olve-
. 11 
· .ment, a maneuver the paper did not support. Still the 
paper di~ not object editorially when, in the fifteen months 
following the Taylor-Rostow report the President increased 
the number of United States advisors from 500 to 10,000 and 
attached them to Vietnamese combat uni ts •12- Perhaps_ t;he 
paper's traditional pro-Democrat stance and its ·admiration 
for ·President Kennedy accounts for the strange silence.-
Agreeing with Alsop, the Cou~ier-Jourrtal also saw grave 
. . 
danger to South Vietnam and to alt Southeast Asia as the· 
result of Communist aggression in Laos.-. ·Perhaps this ,vi.ew 
_ prompted the paper's tacit acc_eptance--of advisor increases. 
lOThe Courier-Journal (Loui~ville), February 12!and 
March 19, 1962. 
11rbid., April 18, 1962. 
12LaFeber; 22• cit., p. 229. 
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Southeast Asia continued to be a thorny problem,' In 
this area the Courier-Journal was committed to two conflict-
' ing policies. It desired to see the United States aid the 
I 
South Vietnamese in thwarthing the growing Communist tp.reat 
I 
' and yet keep American fighting men out of Southeast Asia. 
Laos and South Vietnam, it contended, were in grave danger 
I 
and the United States was about to become involved in an 
Asian land war. To the paper, there seemed to be·no simple 
solutions. Unlike Alsop; the paper could not approve 
drastic steps likely to include mass troop commitment.13 
Rather the staff sought a_middle course, neither hawk por 
dove. To accomplish this, the paper advocated continuation 
of previous policies but-with greater emphasis on helping 
these threatened nations toward military preparedness. Thus 
the paper wanted a deeper more far reaching commitment to 
meet the widening crisis, but certainly not a military 
commitment. 
Joseph Alsop continued his syndicated columns along 
. the same pro-involvement lines in 19_62, calling for wider 
American part.icipation in the war. Bi-partisan support of 
an extensive American engagement in South Vietnam, including 
the use of combat units was predicted. 14 Later, his columns. 
praised the strategic hamlet program, a move designed to 
concentrate the rural population· in a few "strategic"' 
and 
13The Courier-Journal (Louisville), M"ay 15, 26, f 29, 
June 4, 1962. 
I 
.
14rbid., February 24 and M"ay 5, 1962. 
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villages for more adequate defense against the Connnuni!sts, I . 
as a success, 15 and lauded the fighting ability of American 
helicopter units in South Vietnam. 16 Alsop believed both 
moves would counter recent Connnunist advances and make! 
defenses more flexible and realistic. On two occasion,s, 
Alsop maintained that Connnunist.wars of liberation in 
Southeast Asia were inter-related: 
The question in Laos is whether it is wise to 
hand the back door of South Vietnam over to the 
communists while pouring men and munitions into 
S9uth Vietnam through the frbnt door.17 
Like the domino theory, the "backdoor" idea--the notion that 
Connnunist aggressors could outflank South Vietnam's defenses 
by ·control of and infilitrati.on through La9s--was a popular 
version of the Southeast Asian situation in 1962, 18 claiming 
suppo_rt both with. the general public and in high government 
c:i,rcies. Tn line with this thinking, Alsop was among the. 
firs-t to .advocate that the United States make· an armed 
intrusion into Laos in order to deprive the Viet Cong of an 
importan~ supply route. 19 
"
15rbid. ;_May 4, 1962. The Strategic Hamlet program 
was one- el:fort to make the count-ryside more defensible by 
f9rcibly relocating the villagers in defensible garrison 
strongholds called Strategic Hamlets. The overall effect of 
this policy was often the alienation of peasants and loss 
rather_ than gain of government support. 
16rbid.; May 1, and August 21, 1962. 
_
17rbid., May 17, 1962. 
18LaFeber, .2£· cit.~.pp. 228-229 and p, 256. 
19The Courier-J.ournal (Louisvi-lle), April 19, 
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The closing months of 1962 saw the Courier-Journal 
alter its ·editorial policy to justify_President Kenned~ 1 s 
increase in the size of MAAG-V--to· 11,300 advisors. This 
action :was clearly an escalation of the war in Vietnam; 
This _alteration was primarily the work of staff writer I 
. I 
Weldon James, a Karine Corps Reserve Colonel who had just 
I 
. 
returned from the Far East. James maintained that American 
troops were no longer hated or condemned as white men in a 
yellow man's Asiatic war. 20 He heaped praise upon the, 
American Spe·cial Forces counter-insi:irgency efforts, 21 as 
well as the use of Americaµ technological warfare, sucn as 
helicopter airlifts and vertical envelopment.22 In defending 
the Americ_an war effort, James was far more prolific than 
any other staff writer in 1962. 
As the most military-oriented writer on the Courier-
Journal staff, Weldon James had seen his share of war. As a 
United Press bureau chief he was present during the bombin•g 
of Nanking in 1937. From 1942 to 1947 he was a Marine 
officer serving in both the Pacific and Europe and iater on 
occupation duty in North China and Japan. In the latter 
experience he had seen first hand the acti'vities of. Communist 
insurgents. Joining the Courier-Journal in 1948, lie remai'ned _· 
as a reporter and later associate editor until. 1966,-when 
20Ibid., December 12, 1962. 
2lrbid., D~cember 16, 1962. 
22Ibid., December 23, 1962. 
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I 
he resigned to join the Fleet Marine Force Pacific as a 
special staff officer. Since 1942 James had retained member-
ship in the Marine Corps Reserve, returnin~ to active quty 
in 1950-1952 to serve in Korea. Though perhaps he had; 
played a major part in shaping all Courier-Journal Vietnam 
policy since 1954, not until 1962 did his opinion becoJe 
visible when he. published a series of bylined editorials 
following a visit to Vietnam. Courier-Journal president 
Barry Bingham said of James, 11He is one of the fortunate 
people who can see the issues of Viet Nam in clear sharp 
outlines of black and white. 11 His 1962 bylined editori:als 
made his advocacy of involvement clear. 
During 1962, other syndicated columnists carried by 
the Courier-Journal also supported American enlargement of 
the war, some earlier _than the paper itself. James Reston 
claimed that 11a good case can be made for United States 
I 
intervention against Soviet-supplied North Vietnamese guer-
.rillas.1123 Similarly,' Homer Bigart, also of the New York 
. . 
Times, called for an improvement in the United States effort 
to.win the faith of the .South Vietnamese people. 24 
The·Courier-Journal did not draw such conclusions so 
early. The fact that it reached similar conclusions as 
1962 progressed may be attributed to the presence of Weldon 
James on its staff. Support of aid to South Vietnam in its 
23rbid., February 18, 1962. 
24rbid., July 29, 1962. 
i 
efforts -to eliminate the V.iet Cong was at least partia~ly 
I 
. ' 
attributable to the conservative publishership of M"ark'V. 
Ethridge (while not an advocate of massive intervention, 
E~~idge was a strong anti-Communist). 
Nevertheless, despite its escalation in 1962, thJ war 
I 
had remained rather small and far from costly (in December 
' 
the casualty·coun~ stood at forty-two according to James), 
Such a "war" seemed patriotic at the ~ime, and relatively 
easy. to support. After nearly t~n years of peace, war had 
lost much of its horror to the American people; M"any people· 
seemed to view the United States as the savior of demo9racy 
in A~ia. Fighting in Vi.etnam in 1962 to save democracy 
seemed as plausible as had fighting in France in 1917. 
Since World War II the· American public had come to believe 
that.Western Democracy could be exported everywhere and 
cou~d not accept the idea that non-western cultures could. 
not, and· perhaps sho~ld not, attempt to assimilate western 
cultu~. As time went on, ho~ver, rising costs and 
lengthening casualty lists would make the war more abhorrent. 
Consequently fewer persons and institutions would offer it 
·much support. 
. . 
In addition to conservative ~ublishing practices and 
tl;le relative newness of the enlarged war, a third factor 
accounting for the paper's support of the expansion of the 
war, was its attitude toward Pr.esident Kennedy. The Courier-
Journal viewed Kennedy mo~e favorably than it later did 
Lyndon Johnson and since the paper had not to any grea,t 
I 
extent criticized Kennedy's conduct of foreign affairs~ it 
\ 
was in a more advantageous position to support his actions 
in Vietnam. During this same year, the Courier-Journal, 
I 
largely through James' editorials, supported the war effort 
I 
more strongly than it would in later y_ears. I:t had nol yet 
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concluded as had the Toronto Telegram that 11 this is a c;lirty, 
cruel war--as dirty an~ cruel as the war waged py the French 
forces in Algeria which so shocked the American conscience
1
:
2s 
Nor had it decided as had The Nation that· 11by now it should 
be perfectly clear that American forces in Sou½h Vietnam are 
engaged not in protecting 1 freedom' but in the essentially 
' 
ugly business of suppressing a massive peasant insurrection 
against the Diem regime. 1126 Whether or not what The Nation 
said was accurate, the fact remains that these publications 
opposed American involvement in.Vietnam in. 1962 long before 
,•, 
. I 
the Courier-Journal considered such a course.of action.I 
Also that year the Courier-Journal appeared to believe that 
the role of the American military mission in South Vietnam 
was both moral and ethical. This alone was enoug;h tb con-
vince the editorial staff that such ·was a necessary action. 
·In 1963, many events both in Vietnam-and on the domestic· 
scene evoked much Vietnam-related comment from the Courier~ 
Journal and its syndicated columnists •. During the year 
while the situation in Vietnam worsened, the 
25H 't ·t 156 orowi z, QQ.• g_. , p. • 
26The Nation, January 19, 1963. 
presidency-of· 
I -
I 
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the paper changed hands. Barry Bingham took over the I 
publishership from Mark Ethridge. These factors combi~ed.to 
'' I 
make ·1963 a pivotal point-in Vietnam opin;ion for the paper. 
Not only did the Viet Cong appear to be winning on the 
battlefield, but the ,.people of South Vietnam, mainly 
Buddhists·, rose in defiance of the Catholic Di_em regime
1 
• 
. Subsequently, Diem lost favor with the United States and 
/ 
fell to an army coup in November. With these events th~ 
first signs of chronic governmental instability appeare~ in 
Vietnam. 
f 
' The Diem government clearly was corrupt and inadeguate. 
I 
-,1When it fell, however, nothing better was available to ·, 
. replace it, In fact, nothing even as effective could be 
' found. South Vietnam had deposed its only strong. leader 
' 
and replaced him with a weak military government. 
Such action instigated a wave of pessimism in the! 
' I Qnited States in regard to an eventual victory, and the r 
! 
- staff blamed Diem and his government for this decline i~. 
morale. 27 The· staff also·supported the._Buddhist revolt!. 
against gov:ernment oppression from. the time. of its ini t~ation 
. ,· 28 ' I in August.· The Courier-Journal had obviously lost all 
' 
faith in the Diem regime for it stated that, 11Viel;nam 1 s : 
f_amily rule must end soon • .- • it is clearly past time !for 
I 
. 
27The Courier-Journal 
August 14, 1963. 
I (Louisville), July 10, 11, and 
28rbid., August ·20, 22, and 23, 1963. 
.Diem to go. n29 
I 
Apparently the paper had tired of Die~ 1 s 
' 
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corruption, his nepotism in high positions, and his failure, 
in spite of hopeful beginnings, to meet the needs of the 
people, especially.where land reform was concerned. The 
most frequently voiced complaint, however, concerned the 
brutal oppression of the Buddhis_t majority in South Vi\etnam 
·and Diem's favoritism toward the rich Catholic minority. 
Editorial support for the Buddhist majority and opposition 
tq Diem was really nothing new for the Courier-Journal. 
The paper like many other publications had advocated 
equitable redistribution of land and Buddhist particip~tion 
I 
in go-yernment since 1954. ·Critical editorials continued 
throughout September and October, but ceased in mid-November. 
Two clear reasons account for this sudden cessation of 
hostility toward Diem. The primary and most obvious reason 
is that Diem and his government were overthrown in early 
I 
November by an army coup. They were therefore·, no longer 
present to be criticized. Nearly as obvious a reason was 
the assas_sinati_on of President Kenned): on November 22 •. 
.. 
Comment on .this event monopolized much of the space allotted 
. edi.to.rials for· .the remainder of the year. Thus the paper 
carried· no· staff-written Vietnam-related editorials in ,late 
November.or December 1963. 
In this year_, as iri previous years, the syndicated 
series carried by the Courier-Journal closely paralleled 
f 
... 
29rbid., August -29, 1963. 
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the staff-written series as they concerned Vietnam. Walter 
Lippmann, ·who had replaced David LawrElnce and the Alsops for 
reasons to be discussed later, saw victory as impossible in 
Vietnam, but viewed Diem as an evil necessity for maint'ainence 
of the status quo. He, however, advocated pressure 
as well as an American effort to win the confidence 
South Vietnamese people. 30 
' 
on Diem 
I 
of lthe 
Other syndicated writers in 1963. also exhibited this 
loss of faith both in Diem and the war effort·. C. L. 
Schulzberger of the New York Times wrote that the failure of 
SEATO .to act had doomed the war effort. 31 Both M"ax Frahke132 
. I 
and James Reston33 condemned Diem's censorship while Da~id 
Halberstram34 and Robert Trumbu1135 excoriated the inequity 
of Diem's rule (10 per cent Catholics over 90 per cent 
Buddhists). Finally, William R; Frye praised the coup bf 
November which overthrew Diem, foreshadowing talk of a 1 
negoitated peace in Vietnam.36 
·Obviously the 1963 editorial position of the Courier-
Journal on Vietnam differed from its policy of the previou.s 
30 . Ibid., .September 6, 7, and 19, 1963. 
·
31ibid., April 9, 1963. 
32rbid., July 4, 1963. 
-33rbid., September 12, 1963'. 
34Ibid. 
i . 
I 
35Ibi·d., September 3, 1963. 
36rbid., November 18, 1963. 
.. 
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year, The paper in 1963 more clearly aligned itself r against 
Diem, and, to some extent, against the war itself. The_paper 
supported the war effort less in 1963 than it had previously' 
and presented syndicated columnists who voiced such sui:iport 
less often. 
The primary reason for this shift in editorial policy 
I 
was the elevation of Barry Bingham to editor and publisher 
following the resignation of conserva~ive publisher M'ark 
Ethridge. The change which occur.red on September 15, was 
-
certainly a significant factor in the development of a pew 
editorial policy as regards Vietnam. I 
I 
· .· ··Barry Bingham was far more internationalist in his 
outlook than Ethridge had been. A 1928 magna £1:!!!! laude 
graduate of Harvard and holder of six honorary degrees, 
Bingham joined the Courier-Journal in 1930. A longtime, 
I 
· Naval Reserve officer, he served in the European Theater. 
' 
of Operations 1941-1945 and briefly in the Pacific during 
the last year of World War II. Bingham has been, by his own 
admission·,· a lifelong Democrat. In tlie .. 1952 election, p.e 
· served·as national chairman of the Volunteers for Adlai 
Stevenson, and the following sprtng accompanied Stevenson 
on anarqund-the-w?rld tour. D1;1ring this tour, he visi'ted 
bo~h Saigon and Hanoi, These 1953 impressions, Bingham. 
agrees, have affected his thinking on.Southeast Asia ever 
si'nc_e. In his international thinking, however, Bingham: 
I 
I was more profoundly affectlo-d by European experiences, 
I 
Having spent a year as Chief of the M'arshall Plan M'ission 
'42 
to France he was deeply imbued with its tenets and impressed 
l 
' 
with its success. .Later he stated. that similar self-help 
. ! 
p_lans could and perhaps should _be applied. elsewhere in i order . 
to achieve similar results. Perhaps such 'ideas led him to 
support the use of economic rather than military aid i1 
meeting the Far East crisis. After 1945, when .he beca~e an 
I 
editor, his influence steadily increased. By 1969 he ~as 
i 
editor, publisher and chairman of the board of WHAS Incorpo-
rated (which included the.Courier-Journal) as well as the 
paper 1 s president. 
This change appears to have immediately fostered ia 
i . 
rapid growth in Vietnam comment. This increase may, ho.wever, 
be more rightly attributed to increased Buddhist protest 
activity in Vietnam or to the rising cost.of the war (by 
now $1.5 million a.day) rather than any staff change. 
Most likely the disappearance of Ethridge opened the door 
. ' 
I 
and the Bud~hist uprising offered the-occasion. Although 
I 
events in Vietnam may account for the increase in comment 
level, the· s~ift in syndicated columnis'ts from the more; 
I • 
militant pro-involvement Alsop and Lawrence to the more, 
' 
pacifist 
• . . . I 
and anti-involvement Lippmann may be attribute? 
' 
the rising influence of.such persons as Bingham, anti-war 
' • i 
. . 
~artoonist Hugh Haynie and the dove who became Bingham's 
I 
edi.torial page editor:..-Molly c·1owes. Thus policy chimgJ 
was beginning. Seemingly, like more and more AmericansJ-
the management of the paper was beginning to question. ~e 
role of America in Southeast Asia. While not the front [ 
to .. 
I 
runner of all public opinion, the Courier-Journal led mid-
west newspapers in assuming this viewpoint. 
I • 
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I 
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CHAPTER IV 
'IHE EARLY JOHNSON YEARS, 1964-1965 
General Nguyen Rhanh1 took control of th~ Saigon· 
' • . I 
government during 1964 ·and at first appeared so stable_ ;that 
the Courier-Journal sta_ff expressed confidence in his 'r 
I 
positive control of the country. 2 But despite its con-: 
fidence in Khanh 1 s ability, the paper held that.the Vietnam 
I 
situation remained grave. 3 . Supporting the Courier-Journal 
position was Davi_d Holden of the M"anchester (England) 
Guardian whp praised 
Vietnamese people. 4 · 
Khanh 1 s ability to unify the South, 
Other contributors to the edi torial
01
, 
I· 
I 
.I 
. •. I 1General Nguyen Khanh was South Vietnam's Premier I 
from February, 1964, through mid-February, 1965. Since 1 
1968, he has been in exile in Paris. Educated at the I · 
1§:ilitary Academy of Dalat, Khanh later attended the Unit~d 
States Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;·. H~ 
fought "first as a guerrilla against the French and later 1. 
as a French Colonial Forces paratrooper. By· 1_954, he had 
risen to the rank of major. Rhanh was instrumental in , . 
foiling the 1960 coup against Diem. He carefully remaine'd 
on the. sidelines in the 1963 coup which overthrew Diem. · 
Khanh was a Buddhist but not popular with the militant 
Buddhist majority in South Vietnam. ·. His main support cam'e 
from American advisors in Vietnam who thought of him- (as ; 
he ·thought of himself) as "a fighter." . (New York Times, , 
Jm• Sil•> P• 633) • . 1 
2The Courier-Journal (Louisviile) 1 January 3~,. 1964[. 
3rbid., M"arch 4, 1964. 
4rbid., June'30, 1964. 
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pages though, such as Chal,mers M. Roberts, of the Los 
Angeles Times·, who despite his personal ·admiration for ·Khanh, 
. . 
··- disagreed, viewing the situation in Vietnam as hopeles~. 5 
A harsher judgment came from Stanley Karnow of the London 
I 
Observer, who claimed that Khanh lacked 
lead South Vietnam effectively. 6. Thus, 
sufficient .dri ~e to 
I 
although the paper 
appeared to support Khanh through its staff-written editor-
ials., it presented some syndicated writers who expressed 
doubts about his abilities. 
Perhaps the paper was simply employing an accepted 
practice of ideal journalism, showing both sides of a c,on-
.. 
troversial issue. More likely, however, the paper had some 
lingering doubts about Khanh 1 s ability and; lacking the 
staff-unity to compose editorials, resorted.to using 
syndi~ated writers. 
Other sources seem to agree with the paper 1 s evalpation 
of Khanh.. Dennis J. Duncanson, member of the British 
Mission to·Vietnam 1961-1965 and Counselor for Aid in the 
Saig9n British -Embassy 1965-1966, saw·Khanh as a strong man 
·intent.on unifying the country but one who had inherited 
a_riearly_ imp_oi;;s.ible situation. He,faile·d primarily because 
of the· intrigues of_ various politico-religious se~ts wi'thin 
the count~. 7 Bernard Fall, noted French Indo-China expert 
. 5. 
Ibid., February 7, 1964. 
6
rbid., February ,15,.,J,964. 
7Dennis J". Duncanson, Government and Revolution in 
Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 348-349. · 
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and author of several booKs qn ~ndo-China ranging from 1954 
to his death in 1966, also contended that the same Buddhist 
I 
8 I · 
unrest which toppled Diem undermined Khanh. UnfortunJtely, 
· he .concluded, Khanh was the "object of a press buildup of, 
vast p~oportions ••• that later events failed to·subl 
. stantiate. 119 The Courier-Journal apparently was a part of 
I 
• I 
this· press build-up and, taking the United States offi~ial 
view of Khanh 1 s past performance .and character at face, 
value, lauded him in its columns. When this viewpoint 1later 
' . . -
proved to be g~eatly distorted, the paper was sorely d:iJs-
. I 
appointed in the Johnson Administration as well as in Khanh. 
I 
This disappointment probably served to mak~ the paper more 
skeptical of such glowing praise in the future • 
. During 1964, with the increase in American forces to 
I 
• I 
23 ,.000 men including large combat type uni ts, there lo~med 
. . . I • 
a distinct possibility of large scale American intervention 
. . ' 
· and, in a cautious tone, the staff ~xpressed fear that 1imme-
! 
diate action would initiate a Korea-sized war. 10 Syndi;cated 
coluinnist q. L; Schulzbe.rger, on the ~ther hand, claime'.d 
' 
' that·:i.inmediate. action toward more massive American involve-
in.ent. was necessary to avoid defe~f.11 
8Berna:rd Fall, Vietnam Witness 
Pr~eger, .1966)., p. 28 • 
.. 9· 
· Ibid., P• ,289. c.f. Theodore 
CenturyAiiierica, ·pp. 478-479. 
' l 
Thus; .a conflict: of 
(New•York: Frederich R. 
i 
. ! 
Draper.in Twentieth 
lOrhe Courier-Journal.._ (Louisville), February 28, I 1 64. 
llrbid., February 29, .1964. 
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opinion could be found on the editorial pages of the 
.. 
Courier-Journal in regard to future action in Vietnam. 
That the Courier-Journal approved of_ the early Johnson 
. . I . 
policy, which mirrored that of his predecessor on Vietnam, 
is. apparent in its approval of Secretary of Defense Ro_J
1
ert · 
McNamara's fact-finding visit ·to Vietnam which recommended 
. I 
continuation of existing Kennedy12 polic:i,es, Despite this, 
however, the paper continued to express some reservations 
' 
about es~alation of the w~r. 13 Indeed; the staff looke~ 
upon that possibility with extreme disfavor. 
' 
' It saw also a 
i 
dangerous es~alatio~ possibility in enlarging the Vietnkmese 
I 
Air Force, but none. in aiding the Vietnamese Army. 14 · T~e 
' Vietnamese Air Force, it felt, was far more likely to carry 
' 
the war into North Vietnam, Clearly the paper felt the;war 
should be confined to the South, since extension to the! 
I 
North would mean the involvement of more American ground 
. I . 
troops, This was not the proper course to follow, the i 
' 
paper contended. Like· most of the American public, at the 
time, the paper was uninformed that the war had already 1been 
I ·. 
carried North •. Soll\e of the citizenry did know, for Hor6witz. 
! 
contends it was reliably reported that raids into North ' 
Vietnam by South Vietnam forces under United States guiqance 
12rbid,, March 9 and June. 2, 1964. 
13rbid,, May _21, 31 and July 30, 1964. 
14Ibid,, April 19, 1964. 
had been going on since 1961. 15 
I 
When this information: 
48 . 
finally ccµne to light in late 1965 the paper·became further-
embit_tered at the Administration_, now headed by Lyndon ,
1 
Johnson. · · ·. 
Departing from its support of the President in the 
! 
' first quarter of 1964, the paper began· to argue that J~hnson 
was taking unnecessary risks and over-extending_the American 
presence in Southeast Asia. 16 Subsequently, in August, it 
anticipated the danger of rapid and massive escalation 
emanating from the Gulf of Tonkin17 incident in which North 
Vietnamese torpedo boats allegedly attacked two United ~tates 
15Horowitz, ~- ~-, p. 429. cf. New York Times 
rnternational Edition, May 23 and 24, 1964 and December 5 
and 6, 1964. As late as January 17, 1965, The Courier-
Journal was only beginning to realize this fact. On that 
date, a staff-written editorial claimed that the United. 
States had been involved in raids on North.Vietnam, but'the 
people had not been so informed. In such ca~es, the paper 
held, 11 the President should level with us. 11 ' 
16The Courier-Journal (Louisville), M13,y 27, December_., 
23 and 29, 1964. . · . - • , . 
17rn 1964, American naval units pat~o.lled the. Inter-
national waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. When on August 2, 
1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the United 
States Navy destroyers Turner Joy and Maddox, Presid,ent: · 
Lyndon B. Johnson ordered air strikes by carrier-based.air-
cr?ft of the United States Seventh Fleet against North 
Vietnam •. Congress almost unanimously (House 416-0 and 
Senate 88-2) approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution sup~ 
porting the President in 11all necessary measures to repel 
any armed attack against the forces of the United States 
and· to prevent further aggression. 11 · President Johnson, s. 
quick reaction found support both at home and abroad, This 
support, however, did not last. The fear of over-reactfon 
to a minor incident soon began to arise. Some ·influent:Ual · 
persons, mainly Senators J. William Fulbright,· Wayne Mors_e, 
and Ernest Gruening, feared an unneces~ary widening of the 
war would result. Most at the. time, however, fe1t that' 
speed and the appearance of national unity were the essential 
considerations. 
·des.troyers on routine patrol off the North Vietnamese 
coast in the Gulf of Tonkin1 and Johnsonis apparent over~ 
reaction to it, 18 The paper supported his order for imme-
diate reaction by the two American vessels involved but 
49 
I 
questioned the necessity of retailatory bombing ang projected 
I troop increases in South Vietnam, Indeed, the staff felt that 
I 
' the incident-had resulted more from a low level command 
mistake than a North Vietnamese effort. to escalate the war, 
The incident it feared would be all too easy to construe as 
an act of aggr~ssion, and accordingly anticipated Johnson's 
reaction of massive escalation, Rather than escalate the 
war the Courier-Journal suggested that Johnson might instead 
tighten destroyer patrol procedure in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
Ll.ke others later, the paper at this time, obviously believed 
that ~ot all of the blame lay with the North Vietnamese, 
and its editorials offered the possibility that the Un:Lted· 
i States had been. in error or at least overly aggressive •. 
The paper's attitude in this incident is indicative of its 
reac_tion ·to governmental action through_out the year, The 
. . 
paper agreed with Johnson's decision that there should be 
some reactiqn_ to.this North VietF1amese move,_ but felt he 
was simply moving too far too fast and over-reacting to the 
Vietnam situation. 
Ce]'.'._tainly the Courier-Journal in 1964 hacf supported 
Johnson, at least tacitly, in his .early Presidency, I Perhaps 
I .... 
18The Courier-Journal (Louisville), August 4, 5, 
9_,.- 1964. 
I 
and 
I 
' 
i 
this was a carry-over fro~ support of Ke~nedy but eve~ lmore 
likely it was the combination of two factors, the inability 
to react to a'Vietnam policy that had not yet become cqn-
50 
1 
· crete, and the act of allowing the new President a chance 
\ 
to develop his own Vietnam policy. 
·Johnson Vietnam policy jelled, the 
In any case, once the 
i 
Courier-Journal oppo'sed it, 
both.in its staff-written editorials and in .the syndicated 
columns it carried, 
Two well-known syndicated writers, Walter Lippmann 
and James Res ton, were in agreement,_ Lippmann's column 
' 
appeared eleven times throughout the year and in it he ad-
vocated negotiation and an all-encompassing political 
solution which would, 11extend from Siberia to the Himalayas, 
from the Mekong to the Yalu, 1119 Like Lippmann, syndicated 
columnist James Reston was carried more frequently in 1964, 
Reston too argued for neutralization of all of·Indo-Chi~~.zo 
. . 
Perhaps the_ tide of editorial opinion had now -com"-
pletely·turned. . I 
The y~ar 1965 saw the Courier-Journal fully implement 
_the_ antf-:war, ap.ti-Johnson policy it would follow until 
• Jqhnson:Js retirement from the White House; 
The first half of the year was· a period fraught wi, th 
edi·torial fear of continued escalation and pleaii for 
neg'otiation before such escalation might become 'inevitaqle, 
19rbid,, 
20rbid,, 
... . 
Dece_mber 23, 1964. 
February 1, 1964. 
' . 
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.The staff-written editorials of the Courier-Journal fol this 
period reflected many such pleas while expressing lack of 
confidence in the Saigon government. 21 Similarly staff-written 
editorials and cartoons warned of the danger qf a nucl1ar · 
holoc;;iust inherent in seeking victory in Vietnam through 
continual escalation, 22 Obviously the paper had conclt~ded 
. i 
that there was to be little chance of a clear-cut solution 
to Vietnam and certainly no immediate one. 
. ; 
It had begun to 
' 
doubt the Administration's contention that victory was 'just 
' 
around the corner and that another five or ten ·thousand; 
· troops could make the crucial difference between victory and 
• I 
defeat. Indeed, the paper had begun to doubt if°· victory were 
possible and desirable at all in a military sense. As Mr. 
Bingham explained it, his discouragement with Vietnam 
evolved from "the tragic 
piling up of casualties, 
military power is unable 
sequence · of ·events in Vietnam,/ the 
and the progressive ·evidence that · 
to secu;e a clean-cut sol~tionl in.:,· 
Indo-China.n 23 
Subsequently articles appeared that advocated neg9ti-
ations aimed at a restoration pf the 1954 Geneva accords, 
' . ' 
those· same agreements which the paper had disparaged in
1 
· ·. 
1954 as an "Asian Munich." Ultima·tely,'the Courier-Journai 
staff held there was little to gain and· much to lose ·from a 
16, 
I 
1· 
I 21
rbid., January 17, 27, 28, 29, 30, February -5, 9, 
17; zo,'""""24, M'arch 1, 2, 3, and April 4, 1965. 
22rbid., March 4 and April 4; 19'65. 
23Letter from Barry Bingham, Sr., August 10, 1970. 
continuation -of the war. Therefore, the paper began to 
intensely advocate negotiation to end the war before tJe · 
cost in lives as well as dollars became p~ohibitive. 24 
Despite.its gloomy predictions of escalation and interminal 
war, however, the paper through its staff writer John 
Fetterman, an infrequent writer of 
his only Vietnam comment in April, 
signed editorials making 
1965, saw hope for 1sia 
' in economic growth through the establishment of a M"ekorig 
I 
I 
project along the lines of TVA. Fetterman published a~ 
' 
' article entitled ttMekong Project - Alternative to War." He 
suggested _three possible courses in.the Vietnam war: 
escalation, moving the war to North Vietnam, and neutral-
' 
ization of all Vietnam through negotiation. None of tnese 
I 
possibilities had much merit he argued. Rather, a four;th 
52 
.course should be contemplated, Citing the fact that 
guerrillas had not halted engineering projects in the South, 
. . . . I . 
he proposed a project for the economic unification- of a,11 
• . I . 
. I . Southeast Asia--development of the Mekong River, He thought 
! 
such a development would be cheap by comparison to the cost 
. i ·:.. 
of .war and would contribute to the unification of the region, 
ending any threat of war. His project would, like TVA, pro-_ 
.vide electricity for homes, farms, and industry.· It would I .. 
control flooding, thus permitting an increase in rice pro-
·. I 
duction and allowing continuous navigation. M"oreover it would 
give the.people along the Mekong a common bond.which cohld 
. . . C I 
24The Courier-Journal (Louisville), February 25, i965. 
transcend national boundaries and ideological differences. 
In an accompanying editorial the Courier-Journal staff' 
agreed. They contended the project could "kill 
ignorance and poverty in Southeast Asia without 
Counnunis t revolt cannot live. n Admittedly the 
was visionary but, "measured against the other 
I hunger, 
'. 
which· J 
I 
whole·idea 
i 
alternatives 
53 
that face us in Southeast Asia, the Kekong project may •be, 
not so wild a dream,n25 One can see the basic philosophy of 
Barry Bingham in that the Courier-Journal contended that 
·only through economic developnent could Asia be stabliz,ed, 
not by military means of any sort. Obviously the pape; had 
I 
found Vietnam a socio-political, as well as military p~bblem 
and was offering some hope of an economic solution, 
In a speech of April 7, 1965 at Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, President Johnson offered unconditional negotiatipns 
with Hanoi and proposed an internationally financed Asian 
Development·Bank for peace-time reconstruction of the area. 
This evoked favorable comment from the Courier-Journal ~taff. 
But this period of favorability lasted only from about I 
April 8 to -Apri_l 25, 26 when the paper began to express· 
doubts about the real p~ssibility of fruitful negotiations. 27 
Since no concrete action toward negotiation had been· taken, 
the paper began to seriously doubt Johnson's expressed 
25rbid,, April 4, 1965, 
26rbid,, April 9, 13, and 20, 1965, 
27lli£., April 25 and 26, 1965, 
I 
I 
desire for peace and feared he would turn to 
seeking victory.28 Hope for peace ebbed so 
escalatiori in 
i 
low that the 
bombing halt of May 13-19 failed to receive editorial , 
attention, much less any hope for peace. 
54 
Paralleling the staff-written editorials of the period, 
syndicated writer Walter Lippmann, as on previous occasilons, 
I 
' advocated termination of the war through negotiation. He 
also argued for agreement along the lines of the 1954 
29 Geneva accords. The alternative, Lippmann, held, was 
continual escalation which would ultimately lead to world 
' 
conflict. 
James Reston of the New York Times followed similar 
lines in his Vietnam comment for the first half of 1965. 30 
Even C. L. Schulzberger, also of the Times and normally mo:re 
hawkish, professed.that Vietnam was an endless morass of 
deeper and deeper American involvement. 31 Subsequently; 
other syndicated writers expressed similar sentiments. 
Among these were Arthur J. Dommen (United Press International), 
Jack Foisie (Los Angles Times) and George MacArthur·. David 
Lawrence alone _remained a proponent of itfight-to-win-or-
else" policy, 32· but his column was carried so infre_quently 
28The Courier-Journal (Louisville), April 29 and 
May_ 25, 1965. 
29rbid., February 12, 19, 26, March 19, 31, April;2, 
and.May 15, 1965. 
30rbid., March 9 and 30, 1965. 
31rbid., 
32rbid., 
February 6,"March 25, and April 19, 
April 27, 1965. 
I 
I 
. I 
\ 
1965 .1 
J 
' 
by the paper that it was all but meaningless in the I totial 
policy structure. I 
When on June 8 the Johnson Administration announced 
its policy to authorize ~e use of American combat troqps 
as units in battle this decision evoked 
phatic negative reactions from both. the 
prolonged and ~m-
Courier~Journa~ and 
its syndicated writers. 
condemned this action on 
In June alone, the paper's 
· d"ff .. 33 six i erent occasions. 
i 
staff 
At 
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these times the staff expressed concern that Vietnam wru ld 
become an American war, that South Vietnam was fast becoming 
an American satellite, and that Johnson was pushing the 
situation close to the brink of World War III. The paper 
condemned the use of American ground troops and lamented 
that there could be no end to this sort of 11 creeping esca-
lation." Johnson, the paper held, should fight until 
autumn without further escalation, then offer negotiati;ons 
from a strong position·. Similar condemnation and re com-
. 34 
.mendations also came from Walter Lippmann and John 
Averill of the Los An~les· Times. 35 Thus the Courier-Journal 
in-June, 1965, had clearly made its final break with Johnson 
over Vietnam. Never again would the paper support him on 
this issue. 
Barry Bingham explained it this way: 
33rbid., June 10, 11, 12, 18, 20, and 21; 1965. 
' 34Ibid., June 23, 1965. I 
. I 
35rbid. , June 18, 19.65. I 
' 
' 
. i 
.It was on Mr. Johnson's conduct of our operations 
in Southeast Asia that,we became increasingly criti9al. 
I would like to point out; h·owever, that there were I 
frequent editorials in which we made a direct appeat 
to Mr. Johnson to alter some of his positions, to 
cease bombing raids, to seek a ceasefire, to attempt 
a major rally of world opinion around a truce in 
Vietnam. In other words, we did not simply attack! 
him when we thought his policies were going astray.! 
We tried to reason with him, on the constant assump~ 
tion that he was a sane, patriotic, and humane man, 
though a strong-willed and ambitious one.36 
The continued escalation during the summer (troop 
strength in Vietnam grew from 75,000 t? 125,000) brought 
further condemnation of the Johns?n Vietnam policy. Walter 
Lippmann, citing unrealistic war aims as a cause, predicted 
a ten to twelve year war. 37 Tom Wicker drew much the si3ffie 
concl~sion, 38 while Hanson Baldwin predicted that the 
escalation would not stop with the most recent 50,000 
increase. 39 Moreover, Lippmann maintained that, 11we are 
now in sight of a total war. 1140 Even James Reston in an 
Augu~t series warned that the all important p9litical 
aspects of the war we~e fading from the public view, hidden 
by the p.uge military build-up. 41 The paper itself, as is 
cle·arly shown by editorials on such varied dates as January 
17., April 29, and August 31 as well as cartoons on May 25, 
36 
~tter from Barry Bingham, Sr., August 10, 1970. 
· 37The Courier-Journal (Louisville),. July 17, 1965. 
38rbid.; July 10 and 25, 1965 • 
. --
39Ibid., July 29, 1965. 
40 
. Ibid., July 23, 19-65. 
41Ibid., August 5, 15, 24 and ·27, 1965. 
.--. 
June l and June 26, 1965, supported all of these ideas 
through either editorials or editorial cartoons in the 
second half of 1965 and added to them an oft-repeated plea 
. . . I . 
for initiation of .negotiations. _As Mr. Bingham pointed out; 
. . . . . I 
the paper offered real alternatives to the Johnson program · 
and counseled reason and caution.in_ dealing with the vJetnam 
problem. Most of all it criticized Johnson's apparent 
unwillingness to deal with Vietnam as a many-faced_problem 
' 
requiring a complex solution rather than a simple expedient 
' 
solution. Neither the Courier-Journai nor its syndicated 
columnists made any immediate comment concerning the cJristmas 
1 
· bombing halt, since short truces, particularly on holic(ays, 
were by now old hat and the paper apparently saw this one as 
doing little to terminate the struggle. 
I 
A further indication that the Courier-Journal had'. 
. . . . 9 . . I 
achieved a complete reversal of its l 54 stance occurred 
. . I 
when, ori several occasions, it voiced support .of the ve;ry 
. I 
Geneva accords which.it had termed ari "Asian Munich" inl 1954. 
' I . 
. ' Though it offered no explanation for.this stance, perhaps 
. I . 
they felt the accords offered the only possible and remotely 
. . ! 
feasible way out of what.it now considered a "Vietnam m$ss." 
Moreover, the paper appealed for negotiations and condemned 
increased intervention in 1965, ·whereas it had taken the 
opposite position in 1954. Several factors were instrtkntal 
in causing this 'change. The ~hift from the philosophy tf 
Mark Ethridge to that of Barry Bingham was complete by 1965, 
. I 
· and the editorial page had come to reflect the more liberal 
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anti-interventionist policies of Bingham. Bingham had also 
acquired the staff necessary to 'implement this change. In 
1959 cartoonist, Hugh Haynie, ha<:l joined the paper and by 
1965 had clearly become an anti-war voice on the staffr 
C_onse_rvati ve Russel Briney would soon_ be displaced as. \ 
editorial page editor ·by more liberal _and anti·;-war editor, 
Molly Clowes, and the main pro-war voice, Weldon James'j .was 
being heard less. Indeed, James would for this reason soon 
leave the paper. The only new writer, William Peepies,' had. 
• • • • I 
been added in 1961 and he was definitely not pro-war. 42 
As early as 1963, the paper had shown some opposition 
to American involvement in Vietnam. This opposition ha1d 
. ' 
grown through 1964, ~nd in 1965 President Johnson's decision 
I 
to use American combat troops had released its full vengeance. 
I By 1965 also, the growing size and co·st of· the war as well 
I 
as its seemingly interminal nature made it much harder for 
- . I ·• . 
even a moderate to.support than in 1962, 1963,.or even 1964. 
I. 
Consequently the'Courier-Jou:rnal, by now a liberal papet,' 
• I 
• , I 
did not support the war in 1965. Condemnation of our _m~li tary 
I 
action was the rule of the day~ ' '. 
I 
4·2During the entire 
. e!Dlter a signed editorial. 
bias. 
i . 
I , 
i 
' 
,· 
i 
1961-1969 period, Peeples did hot 
It is thus difficult to judge his 
I 
·'. 
CHAPTER V 
JOHNSON'S POLITICAL DEMISE 
During 1966, the Courier-Journal expanded upon its· 
. . 1 · ' 
· i965 position of opposition to the Johnson Vietnam policy. 
, • • • I 
Although the bombing halt of_December 24, 1965 to Jan~ry 
31, 1966, found Courier-Journal reaction late in comi~g, 
I 
the editors emphatically favored: exten~i~nof the halt las 
a step toward peace. 1 Lippmann, _however, felt that th1 · 
' bombing halt or any talks which might result from it hlid 
' 
little chance of bringing peace. 2 On the other hand, 
James Reston wrote that in calling the bombing halt, 
President Johnson was making a genuine move for peace~jand 
in this the Courier-Journal staff_ agreed. Reston argu· ed 
. . I . 
that fear of Red Chinese intervention elsewhere in Asia and 
. . I . 
a desire on the part of the U¢ted States to put up·a !,old 
. . . .• 
front to deter it was stifling peace 
possibility of such intervention was 
negotiations ·when :the 
, I • 
so. remote that--_it i · 
' I 
should be discounted. 3 In this also the Courier:.Journal 
I .. · 
staff concurred. Therefo·re -editorially, the Courier-Journal 
' 
and the New York Times. spoke on the issue as _one voice.I· 
.
1The Courier-Journal (Louisville), January 25~ 19166,· 
2rbid., January 26, 1966. 
3rbid., January 6, 1966, 
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I With the resumption of the bombing in February, the 
. . I 
paper again expressed fear of a wider war and discouragement 
' ' 
with Johnson's policy which it felt was far too escalationist. 
As a result of President Johnson's Honolulu conference 'with 
I South Vietnamese Premier Vice Air Karshall Nugyen Cao Ky, 
both the staff and pundit Walter Lippmann viewed him eJerging 
I . . 
'I , 
as a 11Super Hawk. 11 To.both Lippmann and the st,l'lff, the 
conference appeared a total victory for the militant point 
of view expounded by Ky. 4 Koreover, according to syndicated 
writer Chalmers Roberts, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, not 
normally dogmatic, was beg~nning to sound more and mor~ like 
·former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; a dogmati'c 
anti-Communist militant. 5 The paper seemed to agree and 
held that the time to have that sort of static policy had 
clearly passed. A flexible policy would be more suitaqle 
for the situation then existing. Just what should cons1titute 
such a flexible policy the paper'did not say. .., 
4rbid., February 9 and 'il, 1966. Nguyen Cao Key·who 
came to power in South Vietnam on June 19, 1965 was an ex-
patriate of North Vietnam. He was born in 1930 to "middle 
class parents near Hanoi and educated in various military 
schools in Vietnam, France, North Africa, and the United . 
States. An obscure air force officer until the sixties, Ky 
first-achieved importance as a member of the ruling military 
Junta (1963-65) and as Vice Air Karshall. In·l965 he became 
Premier, a post he held until 1967. During his tenure in 
office he faced several near revolts from Buddh:is::s and army 
officers •. Partly responsible for this was his militant 
attitude and his favoritism toward fellow former northerners. 
He was a strong believer in bombing and in carrying_ the:[ war 
to North Vietnam. He was for this reason supported by the .. 
Johnson Administration but not nearly so popular at horrle. 
In 1968 he became· Vice President of South Vietnam, a c~n-
siderably less powerful position. · 
5Ibid., April 2, 1966. 
This reversal of editorial policy by the Courier~ 
Journal had become too repulsive to a~ least one of its· 
editorial writers, Weldon James, a reserve Marine colonel. 
I 
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He resigned his position as associate editor of the ed\torial 
page on April 14, in opposition to the paperrs.dovelikJ 
posit.ion on Vietnam. He held the view. that it was rrpaJt time 
6 ,1 • 
to say the hell with Ho,rr and so strong were his convictions 
that he volunteered for duty with the Marine Corps in 
Vietnam. Following James 1s departure, the staff adhered 
to its new policy even more closely. Subsequently, there-
fore, during June the pape~ and all of its .syndicated , 
writers voiced opposition to the possible election·of 11hawk11 
Ky in the upcoming presidential elections in South Vietnam. 7 
The paper seemed obligated to oppose Ky. His power base 
was military, while since April· 196_5 · the paper had advo·cated 
an economic approach to the Vietnam problem.· Moreover he 
represented the 11Catholic Ruling· Class"_ which. the paper had 
opposed since 19.63, as.well as the policy of mi-litary 
victory through escala.tion. In short, Ky was totally 
unacceptable. 8 
In line ¢.th the Ky-Johnson war philosophy American· 
bombers stepped up their _activity; The· initial Ame.rican · ,• 
6rbid., April 15, 1966. 
7Ibid., May 10, 11, 17, June ·1,= and August 25, 19.66 •. 
' 
. . . I 8Dennis Blo_odworth, An Eye For the Dragon (New York: 
Farrar, 1970), p. 220. Claimed of· Ky·and Thieu. 11Palace! for 
Palace, torture for torture, victory for victory, they were 
different, only they were the same. rr. He was comparing 'the_m 
to Diem. In essence the paper agreed. 
bombing-of installations around the Hanoi-Haiphong area in 
I 
. ' late·June, resulted in an unfavorable reaction from the. 
9 10 : 
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Courier-Journal. In addition, Reston -and Gavin Young 
(London·observer) 11 criticized .the bombing as both danJerous 
and ineffective. 
During the remainder of July, as more American airmen 
. h th . I were shot down over the Nort, e treatment of prisoners 
• I 
i 
and concern about escalation were the.main topics of Courier-
. ' 
' . Journal _Vietnam comment. The paP.er pleaded for reciprqcal 
humarie treatment of prisoners and 
12 rogation of Viet C.ong suspects. 
moderation in the inter-
It also reiterated 
' ' I 
the by-
I now.coinmon fear of escalation, as did its ~yndicated 
columnists. 13 · Now the paper clearly viewed the war as 
inhumane and as such opposed it and its dehumanizing as:pects. 
I 
· ·, During the remainder of the year as one peace feeler 
I I . 
afte~. another failed, these failures were reflected in l~he 
paper. Occasional cr~ticism of the lack of a Johnson piace 
offensiye was also noted. Clearly the paper felt, as iit 
' 
expressed in its reactions to his June 8, 1965 speech, in 
· which he had made public authorization to use. American ~roops 
as gro~nd ~ombat units, that Johnson should .attempt to 
.! I 
. 
9The Courier-Journal (Louisville), July l and 4, t966 •. 
lO~bid., July 7, 1966. 
11rbid., July 8, 1966. 
' 
12rbid., July 19; 26,'--and August 8, 1966. 
13rbid. , July 20, 21, _and 27, 1966. 
,. 
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initiate negotiations with the North Vietnamese- and possibly 
1-
wi th the Viet Cong. His alleged failure to do so constituted 
i 
a major cause of the paper's opposition to_ his adminis_,ration; 
Perhaps the paper expected' too much from President Johlson, 
The staff .certainly gave him little credi"t for any attempts 
he made at peace feelers and frequently criticized his· 
supposed lack of effort. Apparently the paper never topk 
' ' ' the possibility of reluctance from the North Vietnamese: and 
' Viet Cong into account. The paper simply concluded th~t 
the entire blame. for repeated failure of peace feelers; 
I 
rested with Johnson. The paper's dislike of Johnson may 
! 
well have clouded its vision on this point, 
A Papal plea for negotiations failed in September:. 
SEATO conference in Manila in October showed similar 
A 
I 
-results. Later that month, almo.st everyone (Thant, Johnson, 
DeGaulle, and Wilson) appeared to be talking peace, but the 
Vietnamese, both North and South, did not appear-to be 
'listening. In reaction, 
I 
the Courier-Journal staff expressed 
i 
sorrow at the failure of these efforts, but still advoc¥tted 
attempts at negotiations~ 14 Having discarded the milit~ry 
possibilities, ·the paper could only hope now for a diplomatic 
' ' 
solution and took every chance to promote· the ide·a. Once 
' 
more the paper p~t f~rth its theory that economic development 
. - I 
' . I 
was the key ·to peace and that a concerted determined effort 
should be made by the Johnson Administration to initiati 
I 
14rbid., September 7', 21, and October 22, 1966. 
\ . 
negotiations toward ending -the war. 15 By. November, .bo·tJ 
Restori and the Courier-Journal staff were predicting th~. 
·triumph of Johnson's war critics at the polls as a resu:z!t 
the .failure· of the October peace efforts •16 · 
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of · 
The Christmas season recorded a. bombing halt of nimety-
six hours, and in response to this event, the staff ask1ld 
why·a longer nalt should not be just as acceptable and 
perhaps more effective. 17 Indeed, the.Courier-Journal 9nce more 
raised the question, nWhy half steP.s to peace? 11 · The editorial 
page se.emed. to expound the idea that the presidential pJace 
moves were'more formality than sincere effort. It therJfore 
! 
·condemned these efforts as such and furth~r opposed Joh~son1 s 
Vietnam policy·as incoherent and misdirected. Here again 
i 
the paper became less than objective in its criticism o~ 
i 
. Johnson and_ perhaps underestimated his desire for peace.: 
' I • 
The P?per tended to blame Johnson not the Viet Cong or North 
Viet~amese for the Vie~nam sit~ation. Syndica~ed colum~ist 
Joseph Kraft expressed hope for a long bombing halt, 18 
·white· the staff' added their hopes that' peace itself wou~d 
develop out of .a Christmas truce. 19 
I 
. It;i·· summary it seemed that more changes . had occurr~d in 
I 
., 
tsriiid., September 7 and 8, i966. 
l6rb{d., November 1 and 3, 1966 •. 
~ 
l.7Ibid., December 1, 1966. 
18rbid., December 11 ;-, 1966. 
19rbid., December 16 and 28, 1966. 
the Courier-Journal staff than in the Vietnam situation 
I 
' 
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during 1966, Basically the paper continued to advocate 
~gotiation and to criticize those who proposed more militant· 
measures. Moreover, its syndicated writers supported ·s,imilar 
' 
policies. The anti-involvement policy of the paper was1 
"facilitated by the angry resignation of Weldon James, Jnd 
- I 
the February death of Russel Briney, (the moderate editorial 
page editor since 1948, who was replaced by pacifist Molly 
Clowes). General staff disillusionment with the situation 
in.Vietnam was an important fac~or in generating the 
criticism. As Bingham himself put it: 
paper's 
I 
I 
I 
Granting that the editorial position of the Courier-
Journal has become increasingly critical of our 
involvement in Southeast Asia since 1966, I submit 
that such change as has occurred is a reflection of 
the editorial staff's growing disillusionment with the 
turn of events there, and our unhappy conviction that 
the United States is losing men, money, and inter-
national influence in the process,20 
The now well-established anti-war policy of the 
Courier-Journal continued throughout 1967, In the early 
months, the paper viewed qimly the possibility of peace~ 
Among its syndicated columnists, Chalmers Roberts compared 
Vietnam i~ 1966. to the Indian wars of the last century; 
endless attrition and expense with no worthwhile or ~ttain-
able objectives. 21 Joseph Kraft accused Johnson of _being 
afraid to oppose -the military in seeking peace, 22 an opinion 
201etter to the Author, August 10, 1970, 
21The Courier-Jo~rnal· (Louisville), January 1, 
22rbid., January 3, 1967. 
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I 
I in which Lippmann concurr~d.23 Another syndicated writer, 
I 
Jack Foisie, anticipated no change in the status of the war 
in the foreseeable future. 24 Despite its anti-war policy, 
the paper voiced no objection to the Iron Triangle offensive 
. . . ' i 
(January 8-27)--a relatively successful search and ftes~roy 
. sweep conducted by the Americans_ and South Vietnamese--\the 
largest of the war. It did, however, oppose continuation 
of the bombing of North Vietnam, as did both Kraft and • 
Lippmann. 25 The paper obviously felt that this was detri-
me-q.ta1· to the possible initiation of negotiations which: it 
supported and that bombing the North 
Communists to capitulate. Rather it 
could never force the 
I 
would, as the Luftwaffe 
bombing of London had done, unite them in the determination 
not to be bullied into submission. The paper fel;, there-
fore, that Johnson was making a major error ih his bombing 
policy and that emotion here colored his judgment. I . 
· Whe~ from february 8 to the 12 a lunar new year tJ;Uce 
·was observed, the·courier-Journal staff saw in it a possible 
gatE)way ·to -a permanent cessation of hostilities. 26 Johnson 
.should,_ it neld, unilaterally offer to extend this truce 
·in_defini tely i _thus in effect creati,ng a unilateral cease-
fi·1:'e·. 27°· But no such development occurred. · Still hoping 
23~ .. ·January 4, 1967. 
'24:r::bid., January 8, 1967. 
25rbid., January 11, ,.1.8, 19, and February 1, 1967. 
26The Courier-Jo~rnal (Louisville), February 8, 9,,and 
11,.· 1967, 
I 
27rbid,, February 12, 1967. 
for peace, the paper late that same month and in early I 
March 'joined its syndicated writers in calling for a l 
. ' 
l . bombing halt •. On February 16, the paper made a plea for 
I 
. 67 
negotiations. It discounted the possible risks of sucH . 
talks and concluded ~in the view of this newspaper, holJever, 
all these risks are less great than- a continued plunge . 
along the slippery path of war on.the Asian continent.~ 
Nearly a month later, a staff editorial proposed that 
President Johnson stop bombing the North as a gesture of 
' I 
A word 
I 
peace· which involved no risks t~ South Vietnam. 
from him, the paper held, could remove the only block to 
' . I 
peace. talks. 28 Neither of. these attempts bore any fruitt. 
. ' 
Consequently the paper's criticism of Johnson deepened. 
This criticism became even more evident as a result 
i 
of the war strategy meeting between South Vietnam's 
Premier Ky and President Johnson which took place on Ma~ch 
- . ·, I 
20-21 at Guam. In evaluating the effects of the conference, 
. , - I 
,the Courier-Journal predicted a triumph of the hawk polf cy and 
escalation of.the war. 29 · Since both Johnson and Ky' wer~ men 
totally committed to the.military solution, the paper _ 
1 
seemingly·could reach no other conclusion. At this point 
• I . 
i 
the Courier-Journal strangely omitted making note. of' the 
. . • I 
' new South Vietna~ese _constitution of March 19 which· pro[ 
vided for a bicameral legislature, a president, and vice 
28
rbid., February 16 and 27, 1967. 
29rbid., M'arch 30, 1967. 
I 
president as well as elections the following year. The 
paper perhaps saw little of importance in the constitution 
itself and w9uld reserve judgment until it was implemented 
through nationwide elections in the fall. The 
Journal staff, though not ready to give up the 
Courier-, 
cause, slaw 
little chance that this document would radically change the 
government of South Vietnam. Military-oriented government, 
its excesses, its abuses and its attitudes would remain 
largely unchanged. 
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Once more expressing its di-sappointment, the paper-
concluded that the April United Nations peace plan had 
failed, 30 In this plan, Secretary-General U Thant had 
proposed a unilateral United States ceasefire as a first 
step toward peace. Washington had no official reaction, nor 
did Hanoi, This lack of response on Johnson's part, the 
paper held, doomed the effort, The paper made no mention 
of a similar failure to respond on Hanoi's part, It was a 
repetition of the lunar new year proposal. 
Throughout May, the staff noted the ill effects of 
Vie_tnam involvement. on domestic affairs, Because of Vietnam, 
the paper held, funds for the Great Society and other 
domestic social programs were in short supply,31 ·The editors 
also mentioned the loss of American military flexibility, 
The United States was tied down in Vietnam, and this lack of 
30rbid,, March 30,- 1967. 
31rbid,, May 7, 1967, 
flexibility, the paper held, could be highly dangerous to 
the United States position in ·world affairs •32 
. • I 
In June the staff occupied i_tself with opposi tioli to 
the Ky candidacy for President33 and in July with fear\of 
escalation. 34 This escalation was soon forthcoming. ien 
. I 
on July 13_, a 50,000 troop increase was authorized, the 
staff opposed this action and all other such increases~ yet 
I 
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foresaw further escalation since it believed such escal'ation 
to be an integral part of the Johnsonian war plan. 35_ 
attempt to offset the escalation, the paper in August 
its .appeals for a negotiated settlement. 
Tio 
increased 
! 
In February, 1968, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
. I 
mittee began hearings on the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions, 
and by July its work had commanded the attention of the 
Courier-Journal. Critics of the Vietnam Conflict charged 
. . . . . . I 
the incident which had prompted passage of the Resolution 
had not been accurately reported.. Several Se~ators cl·aJmed:, 
that United States.destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy had not 
been fired on by North Vietnamese torpedo boats as clainied 
! 
and presented Navy documents listing. no damage to the ·sh'ips. 
. . I . 
. ' . 
as evidence •. To counter these allegations iri closed ·hef!;ri~gs 
• • • I 
Sec-retary of Defense Robert McNamara mai_ntained that- the'I 
\ 
32Ibid., May 21, 1967. 
33rbid., June 15 and July 1, 1967. 
34rbid . __ ., July 7, 9, 14, 16, and 25, 1967 • 
35rbid _., July 16, 1967. 
' destroyers had indeed been deliberately attacked and that 
retaliation as authorized by the Resolution was indeed 
justified. The results of the hearings were a decline:in 
. I 
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the- credibility of the Johnson Administration pronouncements 
I 
on the status of the war and eventual repeal of the Resolu-
. I 
· tion. In consequence the paper concluded that the 196~ 
escalation resulting from the Resolution had not been based 
on actual enemy aggression, but rather on a falsified 
report. 36 To support this position a special report by 
1 Anthony Howard. (London Observer) was given space on the 
opposite editorial page. ~oward wrote that owing to the 
Tonkin Gulf debates the doves had gained- the initiative in 
Congress·.3 7 
Late August saw the Courier-Journal directing its 
criticism .at another phase of the Vietnamese situation, i . 
contending that the elections_ in the South were a hoax. 38 
. . 
In particular, the staff deplored 
I 
the campaign techniq~es 
of the·milit_ary candidates Ky and Thieu. 39 In this Tom 
Wi~ker agr_eed.·4o As a ~esult of this and earlier dis-
couragements about Vietnam, the paper began once more to 
. . : . 
i;;_eriously · question the worth of tli.e. American role there. 
The- staff concluded that• Vietnam was not worth its 
36 . 
. Ibid., July 18, 1967. 
37tbid., August 6, 1967. · 
38Ibid., August ..... 14, 1967. 
39Ibid., August 17, 1967. 
40Ibid., August 22, 196 7. 
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cost to date. 41 The natiopal columnists were in agreement 
. ! . 
· and Tom Wi.cker asked, "Even if the war is right in prin~iple 
. · · 42 I 
can these terrible costs be decently borne?" .. He answered 
his own query in the negative. Joseph Kraft contendedj 
"We will still be paying (for) it years after the uglyjlittle 
wa"r is only a bad memory.1t43 M"oreover, Reston wrote tat . 
'I 
' 
even conservative Republican Senator ·Everett Dirksen of 
. . 
rllinois had come to doubt American war. aims.44 These 
1 
• I 
expressions of opinion led the paper to conclude inNoiember 
that President Johnson and Vice President Hubert Humph~ey 
had become political casualties of the former' s war eff:ort. 45 
Though traditionally Democrat, the paper did not· mourn i 
their passing. 
rn 1968 as in the two previous years,· the Courier.-
Journal continued to follow an anti-~ar, anti-Johnson, ahd 
pro-negotiation policy. Despite· the s·eemingiy incessa~~ 
. . I .. , 
calls for peace through negotiations, the prospect for ~uch 
,· 
' was dim and the Courier-Journal selected the Saigon govern-' 
' • I 
ment to bear the burden of guilt. 'The st~ff ·now s·~w. the 
militancy of the Saigon government and· not the opposition · 
. ' . 
41r:bid., 
-
August 29, -1967 •. 
42rbici., August 26, 1967. 
43rbid., August 27, 1967. 
44ri,id., 
. -
Octo.ber 8, 1967 • 
. 
45rbid., November 19,' 1967. 
of President Johnson as tqe primary block to peace46 and 
. I 
columnist Joseph Kraft agreed that peace was far remov~d. 47 
I 
Perhaps the paper's traditional pro.:.Democrat stance moti-
vated it to shift the blame away from the Johnson AdmiJis-
tration in a presidential election_ year. ·Such a mo.ve 1ould 
permit the paper to more easily support the Pemocratic. \ 
caqdidate Hubert Humphrey •. rt is also possible that tqe 
. . ' 
militant stance on the Ky government and the overbearing 
. : 
personality of Ky himself prompted the shift. : 
. The Communist assaults on Hue, Saigon and other m'ajor 
. . . I 
cities of January 30 to Feb_ruary 25 known as the Tet (11nar 
new year) offensive diminished hope for peace even further • 
72 
. . ·. I 
In this rather. successful series of assaults, the Communists 
' . . 
! 
for a time captured Hue, threatened DaNang and disrupted 
traffic to and from Saigon. The resulting shock at the\ 
I 
I • 
relatively easy and unexpected Communist successes brought 
' 
about· the. questi_oning by the paper of American war aims J 
the pacification of the country side, and the ~ffective4ess 
of .t;he_ Vietnamese A~y, 48 Thus the pape_r 1 s editorial c7 
.for negotiation became even louder and it concluded that the 
I 
Vietnam ·war wa_s · clearly a detriment; to many aspects of ', 
. . r 
• I 
American life (i.e. war on poverty, urban renewal, educS:tion, 
etc.),· As such,- it should be ended by whatever means 
46rbid,, January 17, 1968. 
47rbid,, January 24 a,nc;! February 21, 1968, 
48Ibid,, February 8, 1968, 
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possibie.49 Subsequent t6 T~t,. the paper had concluded· 
. I 
.. -(and Kraft and Reston agreed) that the United States was 
really only half-heartedly serious about pursuing peacl 
tal~s. rt further cited the April 11 call--up of rese,ists 
as evidence of this fact.SO President Johnson was·also 
.excoriated for talking peace on·the-one hand while prebaring 
i 
for further escalation on the other •. 
. . 
Despite_its previous admonitions· concerning Amer~can 
. , I .. 
seriousness, the paper praised the Kay 13 beginning of I the 
.. I 
. Parl s Peace Talks. Kraft and Lippmann as well as the staff 
I 
counseled patience as to their 51. progress. Both 
American negotiating team of Averill 
praised \the. 
Harriman and Cyrt.ts 
I 
Vance. The Courier-Journal staff, however, proved impatient, 
for as early as May 15,. the editorial page began to exp,ress 
. j 
impatience_with the apparent lack of progress and true 
nego~iating spirit. 
Perhaps the paper never really believed that the jtalks 
would r,,ipidly lead to a Southeast Asian settlement. Ev~n 
I 
be:l:ore the talks had officially opened the paper had concluded, 
I 
I 
11Th~·circumstances surrounding this guarded advance towfrd 
' 
th!:! -pea;ce table warn that for the inoment caution may be i the 
,. . . ,I 
bet;:ter pa-r:t .of cel~bration, 11 On the same day the paper1 
49rbid., February 11, 18, 19, and 26, 1968. 
50rbid., April .12, 1968 •. 
i 
51The Courier-Journat·(Louisville), May 12, 15, 1, 
and· 18, 1968. 
found reason for both hope and discouragement in yet 
facet of the preliminary talks. It contended that: 
another· 
\ 
. I 
• ~ ._acceptance of the French,government's offer of 
Paris as a site for preliminary talks is evidence I· 
that both nations--the United States and North ·: · · 
Vietnam were the only participants at this time--a1e looking for a way out of the war. But the fact that 
it has taken them a month to agree even to meet to! 
talk about talks is also evidence of the tremendous 
difficulties that lie ahead for the negotiations.5~ 
' 
The paper's faith in the long-awaited talks wane4 even 
further owing to the Battle of Saigon (June 3-15) and heavy 
. . 
July increases in American casualties. 53 These things i 
seemed to prove the enemy's unwillingness to negotiate. 
The paper already knew of Johnson's reluctance. Final]y 
I 
the paper was willing to admit that the blame for the 
I 
failure of peace feelers might not always lay with J ohJson 
' 
' or Saigon, that there were two sides to be considered; :that 
' I the Viet Cong or North- Vietnamese might be the reluctant, 
ones. 
The final blow to whatever hope the paper might s1till 
'. 
have held for peace in 1968 came with the announcement ;that 
I 
during August American forces had been increased to 5411,000. 
' The staff lamented this new es.calation, blamed Johnson and 
' 
concluded that the "hawk" image engendered 
to curse Democratic Presidential candidate 
in the November elections. 54 
52rbid., May 4, 1968. 
53rbid., June 5,'1968. 
54rbid., June 18, 1968. 
by it wo~ld ~emain 
. l 
Hubert Humphrey 
. I i . . 
1 
.The Courier-Journal made little mention of Vietnam as 
' I, 
an issue in the 1968 Presidential election. Perhaps t~is 
was true because the paper saw lit~le difference in thJ 
Vietnam views of the two major candidates Democrat HubJrt 
I Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon,. Perhaps it was 
1
also 
I 
true because the paper felt that neither candidate offered 
a true alternative to the Johnson policy, As early as 1 
March 15 and 18, the paper claimed that Nixon was but an 
echo of Johnson on Vietnam, 55 In July the paper saw hi~ as 
a sphinx on Vietnam and as late as October 3, referred :to 
him as an 11artful dodger" on Vietnamese questions. 56 The 
paper seemingly felt that Humphrey was permanently tied 
to Johnson 1 s Vietnam·policies. No matter how he tried to 
escape the association, he would always be linked in the 
public eye, with Johnson on Vietnam.s·7 Thus the paper_. 
apparently felt that neither candidate offered a different. 
course in Vietnam and consequently spent little time com-
menting on the view of either • 
. . 
On November 1, President Johnson initiated a.limited 
bombing halt and, despite its apprehensions about the, 
' . 
. ' 
75 
political overtones of the ban, the Courier-Journal ·supported 
it as a move toward peace. 58 In December, the paper 
55rbid., March 15 and 18, 1968. 
1968. 
56rbid,, 
.-
57Ibid., 
July 19 and October 3, 1968. 
June 18, September 12, and 14, and 
_· I 
October 1, 
58rbid,, November 2, 1968. 
\. 
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·reiterated its earlier conclusion that the Saigon gove
1
rnment 
was a 
or on 
liability and not an asset 
the battlefield. 59 Joseph 
i 
in the·Paris peace talks, 
Kraft again agreed. 60; · 
• I 
Further concluding that the myopia of the United Stateb 
Embassy in Saigon was responsible for much of the distlrted 
. I 
news coming from war zone, as for many tactical blunders, 
• I 
the paper en~ouraged the Embassy's reo~ganization. 61 +t 
recommended the replacement of older embassy personnel, in 
the hope that new men would bring new ideas and not be 
fossilized by yesterday's mistakes. 
Thus in 1968 the paper's hopes for peace were lifted 
by the Paris peace talks only to be dashed by insufficient 
progress there and further escalation of the war. This 
disappointment deepened the paper's bitterness toward 
_Joh~son and the Saigon government, leading it to open and 
frequent criticism of both. In 1968, the paper reached, 
- I 
both.its _depth of despair about the war, and its height of 
criticism of Johnson and Saigon. Yet, its main concern 
was. peace.,. _and :it s·till praised anyone, even Johnson during 
. the Novembe·r bombing halt, who openly sought peace by any 
·means •. · Though ·it criticized Joht}son, tre paper did not 
' 
openly·malign him but rather, as Bingham maintains: 
59lli£., November 12, 14, 
1968. 
28, 30, December 2 and 18, 
60rbid., December 2, 1968; 
6lrbid., December .... 20, 1968. 
: I 
· .Our criticisms of Johnson's policy were. based on 
. developments that occurred during his administration, 
at points when we felt that he was making unwise ; . 
decisions.62 , 
I 
77 
In 1969 ~ the Johnson Administration ended as a tbtal · 
I . 
disappointment to the paper. Still the editor held out hope 
for the .future Nixon Administration 1 s policy on Vi~tnaih. 63 · 
. . I 
'Kraft praised Nixon's realisti•c approach to peace, as did the 
. . . - I 
staff. 64 Both expressed hope for.a rapid end to the w*r. 65 
I 
! . 
62Letter to 'the author, August 10, 1970. 
1969. 
63The Courier-Journal (Louisville), January 7 and 8, 
... 
64rbid,, February 2, 1969. 
6Slli.£., February 1, 1969. 
. '· 
CHAPIER VI 
THE CONCLUSIONS 
In fifteen years the Courier-Journal transformed 
itself from a conservative interventionist stance on Indo-
1 
China to a position of anti-involvement. It changed from.a I . 
1954 proponent of American airstrikes into Indo-China to a 
I 1969 opponent of the same tactic. This change became appar-
·ent in the paper's disenchantment with Lyndon Johnson's 
handling of the. war. The cost of the war·under Johnson
1 
became too high in lives and in dollars. No.attack had! 
I been. made on American territory and the nation's security 
was clearly not in jeopardy. No justification existed for. 
. . I . 
a war·on such a scale. World War II had been much larger 
I 
·- and many times more costly, but in that instance clear war 
I 
aims could .be. shown· aI).d causes for hos_tili ties jus tifieq. 
I 
_While the paper could support small low.:cos t efforts by i 
·~· I 
-the-United States to maintain a pro-western balance of I I 
power o~ers'eas, it could not justify or even condone su~h 
massive intervention as Vietnam·had become by 1969. If 
Vietnam had remained small and limited in :scope.as the 
Lebanon ·intervention of 1958 or of short duration as the 
Dominic.an Republi6 interve~tion ·of. 1965, it ~ight well Jave 
maintained Courier-Jou~al '"~ditorial support. Had it belgun, 
as.did World War II, as a defense of American territory the 
78 
79 
paper might have justified its continuance as necessary to 
' 
national security. Lacking all of these attributes, h9wever, 
the Vietnam war rapidly lost the paper's support and earned 
! 
its opposition. Compounding earlier problems of foggy war 
aims, improper methods and failure to justify American 
commitment to the press and the people, Vietnam became an 
American war in Asia with vast manpower commitments. The 
idea of such a war had never been popular in the United 
States. When, in the 1930 1 s, Japan had attacked China the 
nation sympathized with the Nat~onalist Chinese government 
but sent no troops. The United States declined to commit 
troops to aid the Nationalists against the Chinese Communists 
in 1945-1948 and as a consequence saw China 11 go Communist. 11 
rndeed the Truman administration recoiled from the idea of 
sending troops into China during the Korean Conflict even 
for protective reaction. Land war in Asia was clearly' 
repugnant to many Americans. The Courier-Journal saw 
massive involvement in Vietnam as just such a war and opposed 
i.t. After 1965, the paper could no longer countenance the 
gro_wing Americ8:n commitments to Vietnam or the combat 
casualties which went with them, and would not rationalize 
them with patriotic cliches. rn addition, a concerned 
paper could not overlook the many examples of American 
burigling of the war effort, and needless waste of lives!and 
money. rn view of these facts the paper concluded that 
South Vietnam was not worth the price. 
price i~deed seemed high. · 
To the paper the 
I 
I 
' 
' 
80 
By 1969, not only were casualties already in excess of 
I 
the Korean Conflict, but the war had created ·a huge rift in 
• I 
I American society. Open conflict occurred between "the j 
establishment" which supported the war and those who oplposed 
it. Conscription had become repugnant to many _young Americans 
bring~ng draft evasion and desertion to all-time highs.! 
American society as wel_l as world opinion was sgocked ait . 
I 
American abuses and excesses in the conduct of the war. As 
a result American prestige suffered a tremendous blow. All 
· of this, the paper concluded, negated any value success in 
• I 
Vietnam might hold. The paper reached these conclusions in 
1965, and thereafter voiced them with increasing frequehcy. 
Perhaps as important as its disenchantment with 
Johnson was the paper's dislike of the chronic corruption 
· and instability of the governments in Saigon. Assis ting 
such governments, much less fighting for their survival, 
I 
seemed to have little merit. In turn the paper had con~ 
demned Diem, Khanh, Ky, and Thieu for much.the same fau:J_ts. 
None of these men had carried'out a program of land re-· 
. . . 
distribution, seriously attempted to democratize their 
regimes, or eliminated a significant amount of the corruption 
in South·Vietnam1 s government or military. The paper's 
lack of faith in "Vietnamese Democracy,." often exhibited 
through cartoonist Hugh Haynie, became most vehement as .the 
fall of 1967 Presidential elections in Vietnam neared. 
Haynie.depicted the ruling military Junta as a tank cru hing 
civilian candidates and titled his ca;toon !!Political 
Steamroller."1 On other occasions Haynie portrayed Ky and 
Thieu as a two-headed monster and .the·Saigon government as 
. . . . I 
a puppet controlling its supposed operator·nuncle Sugar." 
The editorial staff had little faith in the effectivenlss, • 
. I 
democracy, and popular support of such a government. I.is 
dislike had begun with Diem and continued to its deepest 
point with Ky and Thieu. 
·1 
What the paper failed to understand was the true, 
' 
· nature of the political situation in South Vietnam •. Never 
. I 
had the Vietnamese had a Western democratic background jnor 
Western style civil rights. Perhaps application of the1se 
. . I . 
. . ' 
concepts was not even desirable or possible in Southeas:t 
Asia. Perhaps Communism would not have been wrong for! 
South Vietnam. Compounding this error, the paper over-: 
simplified the role of Ho Chi Minh.· He was not simply ~n 
appendage of world Conmunism, but rather an independent 
force. He was the- most significant "nationalist leader of 
the Vietnamese people •. His forces had struggled .for a I . 
. . . 
long time to free Vietnam of French rule _and were certainly 
not about to place themselves under Chinese control. 
I 
While 
dislike and 
. . I 
the paper was probably_ qui t_e ·correct in_·i ts I· 
criticism of South Vietnamese leaders from Diem 
to Thieu it overlooked the deeper reasons for their 
unpopularity. Their's were not locally supported 
ments but rather extensions of the desires of two 
govern-
I 
outside 
1-
.. 
lThe Courier-Journal (Louisville), August 17, 196i. 
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· powers,· either France or t,he United States. Thus much of 
the criticism offered by the Courier-Journal was misdirected 
and the po.ssible result of a poorly 
Furthermore, the paper became 
seemingly endless nature of the war. 
i 
informed editorialistafE. 
disillusioned by tJe 
I 
. I 
rt was perfec.tly I 
' 
willing to support one-shot airstrike intervention in 
or .even the Tonkin retaliation of 1964, but not years 
I 1954, 
i 
df 
attritional war. Endless commitment to Vietnam seemed to 
the paper a misallocation of military and monetary resources. 
Vietnain had become a war with no visible progress. There 
were no static front lines, no clearly defined strategic 
objectives, and no concrete goals. Tnstead the entire i 
' . . ' 
enormous effort was directed at the nebulous end of freedom 
for Vietnam, a doubtful development to begin with. Any 
-reporf of progress coming from Vietnam was subject to doubt, 
Credibility declined after revelation of the untruths of. 
the Tonkin affair, The body count of Viet Cong killed was 
found highly unre1iable and thus not an indication of 
succ~ss, ·only Administration and Saigon government assur-
. anc:es. th.at vic·tory was II just around the corner, 11 that 
·
11another 50,000. troops would insu'I'e victoryn remained, 
Repetition soon dulled the effect of these· pronouncements 
and left a feeling that perhaps progress was not possible, 
Th:i..s the paper· could not tolerate. As the war grew lon~er 
with no end in sight and no visible progress, the paper' 
increased opposition. ... 
Changes in the administration ·of the paper and in the 
I 
! 
83 
composition of its editorial staff also helped account for 
its change in policy. In 1963, the paper changed hands from 
I 
' 
conservative Catholic publisher M"ark Etheridge to libet-al 
. I . . . . 
Barry Bingham. This made a shift in editorial policy almost 
inevitable. It put an outspoken critic of Lyndon John1on 
and American foreign involvement at"the paper's head at a 
time when all segments of public opinion were beginninl to 
I 
turn against the war,.and when Johnson was assuming fu~l 
' 
responsibility for its conduct. The paper merely went/ 
further and faster than public opinion in its criticism of 
. I 
Johnson and Vietnam. It was an accurate harbinger of the 
. : 
i 
American mood on Vietnam. In the end, the paper and public 
.· . ! 
opinion reached parallel conclusions: that Lyndon Johnson·, s 
/ . 
policy on Vietnam had been wrong; that Vietnam was an 
incredibly sticky mess·; and that· the United States shou"id 
I 
endeavor to find some quick, but honorable way out of that 
a negoj·ti· ated mess, preferably a timetable withdrawal based on 
settlement with North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and South 
Vietnamese. The essential difference, however, lay.in the 
I 
fact that the Courier-Journal reached these conclusions' 
earlier, and advocated the. rapid solution of the proble~s 
' 
they entailed more emphatically _at an earlier date. ·Asllate 
as M"arch 1966, a Gallup poll showed that 50 per cent of 
tho·se interviewe_d favored Johnson's handling of the Vie nam 
war, while only 33 per cent disapproved and 17 per centlgave 
no opinion. The Courier-Journal had disapproved his ha dling 
I 
of that situation since early 1965. Not until M"arch 1967 
did public opinion begin the _sw~ng fully away from Johnson. 
I 
Even then only 49 per cent disapproved of his efforts and 
' I 37 per cent still approved. Though in 1967 the Courier-
Journal vehemently favored a halt to the bombing of Notth 
Vietnam, polls showed only 15 per cent of the poputacelheld 
2 ' 
.this view, while 63 per cent opposed such action. Inqeed 
84 
as late as M"ay 1967, a Harris poll showed 43 per cent of the 
people interviewed favored further escalation, a policy the 
Courier-Journal had opposed since. 1965. 3 Thus, it is clear 
that on the issue of Vietnam, the Courier-Journal, especially 
after 1964, led and shaped public opinion rather than 
followed and was shaped by it. Even Barry ,Bingham, Sr., 
admits: 
r would define our policy in this matter as left 
of center. , • • We were affected by the continued 
accumulation of evidence pointing to the futility of 
·.our search for a clear-cut solution in Vietnam. The 
American reliance on airpower as an instrument of i 
deterrence has been sadly compromised by our experi~ 
ence in Southeast .Asia. We have not shown the hopeful 
degree .of adaptability to the conditions of a guerrilla 
war, M"r. Johnson's plans were clearly based on con~ 
fident.predictions made to him by.the best military 
··brains at his disposal, and confirmed in many cases 
by his closest civilian associates, We came to the 
conclusion as_ time passed that he was honestly misled. 
We. f_elt that he was plunging ,further and further into 
the morass, as one after another of the promised 
successes turned into failure.4 ., 
' 
. . 
.Perhaps a much more simple explanation for the Courier-
Journal turn of opinion may be found in the change of ttle 
2rbid., M"arch 13, 1967. 
. "'·. 3· Ibid., M"ay 15, 1967, 
4correspondence by Barry Bingham, Sr., to-author, 
August 10, .1970, 
I 
tone of the times. In 1954, the United States looked upon 
itself as the guardian of democracy worldwide. That ·d,uty 
included cont~ining Communism whether in Greece, Aust~ia, 
. I 
or Indo-Cllina. Under the leadership of John Foster Dul1les 
the'State Department sought to support "democracies" 
85 
throughout the world. These included Guatemala, the Dominican 
' 
Republic, an~ South Vietnam. The early fifties were days of 
crusades against Conmunism both at home and abroad. In 
1954 the paper simply followed these trends, As the 
fifties progressed into the sixties these rtdemocracies" 
which the United States had defended were revealed to be 
not democratic at all but often dictatorships, in some cases 
more oppressive than Conmunist regimes, The attitude of 
the press then softened on Communism. This coupled with the 
editorial staff 1 s conviction that America's position in 
Vietnam was morally wrong and nationally debilitating,· . 
. ' 
served to turn the paper to opposition to the war. This 
opinion was reinforced by a similar turn of public sentiment 
after a lag of about two years. Perhaps the United States 
and the Courier-Journal had learned that we cannot be the 
· guardian of democracy, that democ,r<;1cy cannot be fostered 
in.Asia~ that we cannot dictate other people's morals, that 
we are not' all-knowing nor always right. In this chang~ng 
' 
of 'the time_s may lie the main reason for the turn of thJ 
Courier-Journal. 
.. .. 
.. 
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APPENDIX I . . j . 
This appendix contains charts noting both overal . 
.. and monthly interest levels for ·courier-Journal VietnJ 
opinion. During 1956, 1957, and 1958 no Vietnam relatJd 
. l 
editorials appeared. For purposes of·this compilation~ 
editorial cartoons are counted a& one unit of comment. 
Syndicated sources are also tabulated 
I 
to provide contrJst 
' 
and comparison to•Courier-Journal interest levels. 
i 
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APPENDIX II 
·This appendix contains samples of the work of staff 
cartoonist Hugh Haynie. Dates shown were selected to 
show Haynie 1 s reaction ·to significant events in°Vietnam, 
I 
or certain periods of special interest •. 
Plate i 
Plate ii 
Plate iii 
Plate iv 
Plate V 
Plate vi 
May 15, 1962 The first Laos crisis 
October 9, 1963 - The Diem crisis 
August 5, 1964 - The Gulf of Tonkin Affair 
M"ay 2, 1967 - Criticism of.Johnson 
April 26, 1967 - Escalation 
September 10, 1967 - Peace 
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THE EDITORIAL POLICY OF THE LOUISVILLE 
COURIER-JOURNAL AS REGARDS VIETNAM" 
'John A. Mitchell, M.A. 
Morehead State University, 1973 
Thesis Abstract 
Director of Thesis: Dr. W. Edmund Hicks 
-The Louisville Courier-Journal changed its position 
I 
on Vietnam dramatically in .the fifteen years following ;the 
' 
French defeat by the Communist Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu 
in 1954, At the beginning of this period, in 1954,and 
1955, the paper took an internationalist interventionist 
stance. Although it never advocated commitment of American 
ground troops, the paper's editorial staff supported air-
strike intervention and technical-logistical assistance: to 
French anti-Communist efforts. ·After.the conclusion of._ a 
negotiated settlement and a decline in the fighting in' 
Inda-China; the paper t~rned its attention elsewhere and 
maintained relative silence on Vietnam until 1961, 
I 
In the early sixties the Couri"er-Journal expresse~ 
. ' 
concern about the widening war in Vietnam and the excesses 
of the Ngo Dinh Diem government then in power, rt never-
theless approved advisor increases instituted by President 
Kennedy. However, 1963.proved to be a pivotal year. 
that year South Vietnamese President Diem was 
I-n 
I 
overthrown by 
1 
an anny coup, U.S. President Kenredy was assassinated and 
the publishership of the Courier-Journal changed hands 
from Mark .Ethridge to Barry Bingham. By the mid-point of 
the following year these three events had changed the tone 
of the paper's Vietnam policy. The paper detested the 
unstable governments which followed in rapid succession in 
Saigon and believed President Johnson's Vietnam policy in 
error. 
2 
During the remaining years, 1964-1969, the Courier-
Journal widened its disapproval _and deepened its criticism 
of Johnson and of the Saigo_n government. By 1969 it had 
transformed itself into an obvious critic of the Vietnam war. 
In part, these changes were simply reflections of the 
changing public viewpoint concerning involvement in South-
east Asia. They also resulted from changes in the Courier-
Journal staff. The addition of cartoonist Hugh Haynie in 
1959 gave the paper its most effective and visible war critic 
and the departure of Weldon Jame.s in 1966 removed the last 
war supporter from the editorial staff. The 1963 publisher 
change removed _the strong anti-Communis t Ethridge and brought 
Bingham to power. Changes in United States Vietnam policy 
also helped stimulate the paper's shift. While it• could 
support increases in the number of advisors by President 
Kennedy, the paper could not condone commitment of American 
ground troops by President Johnson. It had always opposed 
such a commitment. Neither could it approve Johnson's 
bombing of North Vietnam. 
Perhaps the largest factor in the paper•s shift las 
3 
I 
.the changing nature of the war itself, Always increasing in 
size· and cost (both in money and in lives), the. war sekmed 
I . 
endless. It appeared a drain of the American way of life, 
·a disruption of domestic and foreign affairs, and a blkmish 
on the American image, As such the paper se~med bound!to 
oppose it, 
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